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# THE *Asbury Seminarian* ★ ★

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Vol. IV

No. 3



Fall ♦ 1949

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TRAINING A SPIRIT-FILLED MINISTRY

# THE ASBURY SEMINARIAN

ASBURY THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Wilmore, Kentucky

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## The President's Letter

JULIAN C. MCPHEETERS

The enrollment for the fall quarter at Asbury Theological Seminary is 318. The peak enrollment for the previous year was 282. The student body comes from 83 colleges and universities, 28 denominations, 41 states and seven foreign countries.

A twenty-four hour vigil of prayer was observed during the week following registration. Dr. Lela McConnell, President and founder of the Mount Carmel School, in the mountains of Eastern Kentucky was the guest speaker at two of the main public services. Dr. R. F. Ockerman, pastor of the Methodist Church at Wilmore, spoke at one of the main public services.

One of the significant events of the year in the total Asbury program, is the fall revival on the campus of Asbury College, in which the town of Wilmore and the seminary participate with the college. Dr. John R. Church was the Evangelist for the revival which was held in October. The revival proved to be another of the great revivals in Asbury history. The long altar in the Hughes auditorium was crowded with seekers night after night. Pentecost was manifest in reality.

For many years, the town of Wilmore and the two Asbury institutions have periodically been confronted with a shortage of water. Asbury College owns the water system and has supplied the town and the seminary with water. A great supply, coming from wells, proved to be inadequate in times of drought. The shortage of water proved to be quite serious on a number of occasions, even to the point of threatening the closing of both institutions.

The water situation has at last been solved through the timely efforts of Dr. Z. T. Johnson, President of Asbury College, and the Board of Trustees of the College. A new water system, the latest in design and efficiency, supplied with water from the Kentucky River, has been installed. The new water plant was installed during the summer months and made ready by the opening of the fall quarter, under the direct supervision of Dr. Z. T. Johnson. The town and the seminary are deeply grateful to Dr. Johnson and the Board of Trustees of the College for this splendid achievement. The new water system was installed at a cost of approximately \$150,000.

Five new students have been enrolled from other countries, one coming from Norway, one from Korea, one from Japan, and two from India. We anticipate a further increase in enrollment from other countries at the opening of the winter quarter in January.

A second phase of the new building program of the seminary was launched at the June commencement. The new campaign is for the erection of the chapel and the library building. The campaign was initiated with cash and pledges totaling \$195,000. The student body, since the initiation of the campaign, has assumed an undertaking of \$33,000. The goal for the new campaign is \$600,000.

The leader for the Holiness Emphasis Week, November 8-11, was Bishop C. V. Fairbairn. The annual ministers' conference will be held January 31-February 2. The Lizzie H. Glide Lectures for the conference will be delivered by Bishop J. Paul Taylor and Bishop Paul B. Kern.

The new staff members coming to the seminary this year, include: Susan B. Schultz, A. B., M. S. in L. S., Librarian, Jack Howard Goodwin, A. B., M. S. in L. S., Head Cataloger, A. Warnock, A. B., M. A., Assistant Cataloger, Beulah Bevins, A. B., Registrar, Barton Fletcher, A. B. Assistant in Music, and Robert Fraley, A. B. Assistant to the President in the Field.

The days ahead hold an increasing challenge for the seminary. We request the prayers of the readers of *The Seminarian*, that we may respond to this challenge under the leadership of the Holy Spirit.

#### Notice to Subscribers

It assists the mailing staff of *The Asbury Seminarian* if subscribers will report changes of address promptly.

Thank you

## Go Preach!

JAMES D. ROBERTSON

Never in the history of preaching have so many alluring by-paths of ministerial service sought to draw the Christian preacher from his task of preaching. It can hardly be said that these have contributed in any marked manner to the proverbial decline of the pulpit in modern times. Other factors in our day have been more crippling to the usefulness of the pulpit, not the least being the kind of content values of sermons themselves. Happily there seems to be a rediscovery of the central importance of preaching coming not only from "the so-called practical men of the church but from the theologians as well."<sup>1</sup> The frustration, however, being experienced especially by young men facing the bewildering variety of emphases in the church's program is such that some re-examination of the historic preaching credentials seems expedient. This calls for a brief excursion into familiar territory, even at the risk of seeming tedious.

Just as the prophet is the most arresting figure in the Old Testament so is the preacher in the New Testament. That preaching was central in the ministry of our Lord is made amply clear in the Gospel record. The first reference we have of Jesus' ministry is, He "came teaching the Kingdom of God." At Nazareth He revealed that His mission was "to *proclaim* good tidings to the poor . . . to *proclaim* release to the captives . . . to *proclaim* the acceptable year of the Lord." His initial charge to the Twelve at the beginning of their ministry was, "Go *preach*." So also His last words were a solemn injunction to "*preach* the Gospel and make disciples of all nations." It cannot be without signi-

ficance that Christ's commission to the disciples places preaching first. The apostles themselves were later to appoint deacons in order that they might give themselves wholly to the ministry of the Word. Paul was eventually to write to the Corinthian Christians that Christ sent him "not to baptize but to *preach* the Gospel." It was God's plan, he added, to save men "by the foolishness of *preaching*." Each of the New Testament words translated "preacher" contributes its shade of meaning to the whole and each has to do with the art of speech. The preacher is essentially a voice.

The Christian church was launched with preaching. On the Day of Pentecost men heard the Gospel, each in his own tongue; and on that day Peter preached his greatest sermon. From the time of Augustine and Chrysostom and Ambrose till the days of Beecher and Spurgeon, the church's greatest contribution to the world has been her pulpit ministry. Such names as Savonarola, Wycliffe, Huss, Luther, Calvin, Knox, and Wesley are effective witness to the value of preaching in bringing about great moral and social reforms. In fact, the spirit and life of the church and the quality of preaching have advanced or declined together.<sup>2</sup>

It was never intended that the ministry of the Word should be an adjunct to the great work of saving men. As Professor Farmer points out, preaching is "indispensably a part of the saving activity itself."<sup>3</sup> To insist, as some do, that preaching finds its inception and inspiration in

<sup>1</sup>Kennedy, G., *His Word Through Preaching*, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Broadus, J. A., *On the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons*, pp. 2, 3.

<sup>3</sup>Farmer, H. H., *The Servants of the Word*, p. 21.

the psychological nature of man, i.e. man's passion and compassion must find expression in action, is a totally inadequate explanation of this unique calling. It is enough to say that preaching had its beginning in the sovereign will of God, and is the expression of the Divine compassion. Farmer sees the distinctive nature of preaching as "that divine, saving activity in history, which began two thousand years ago in the advent of Christ . . . It is God actually probing me, challenging my will, calling on me for decision, offering me His succour, through the only medium which the nature of His purpose permits His to use, the medium of a personal relationship. It is as though, to adapt the Apostle's words, "God did beseech me by you."

It would be foolish to insist that preaching should monopolize a man's ministry. Pastoral care is inseparably bound up with the work of the pulpit. Yet it can never be a substitute for pulpit power. Henry Sloane Coffin once remarked that great congregations are never built by ringing door-bells. Bishop Gerald Kennedy writes, "There is a saying that a house-going ministry makes a church-going people. If that was ever true, I do not believe it is today." In an age without hospitals, asylums, and sanatoria, Christ's own ministry might well have been monopolized by healing diseased minds and bodies yet the emphatic note in the Gospel is, Jesus came *preaching*.

Nor are the minister's obligations to be ignored with respect to administration, religious education, and worship. Each has its lawful demand on the time and energy of the man of God. The unwarranted em-

phasis being given to some parts of the Church's program is due partly to social seminary specialist's fondness for his own demands and partly, if inevitably, to the familiar sphere. It is the singular stress being given to these essential but subsidiary parts that is the source of so much bewilderment to the young preacher. Unless he keeps his call to preach crystal-clear, all too frequently he finds that numerous organizational activities and institutional interests are dissipating his energies and muzzling his prophetic voice. In consequence, on Sunday mornings the hungry sheep look up and receive but slender fare.

In our day of specialization, when congregations lack that community of interests which characterized the days of our forefathers, only the messenger of God is in a position to help men to see life steadily and see it whole. Without his interpretation of the Vision of God, men must become something less than men.

There is no danger of the work of preaching ever passing away although it may suffer periods of decline and may need to change its forms to meet new conditions. Its mission is perpetual in the mind of God. It will remain the church's greatest potentiality for attracting men regardless of times and seasons. Wherever a truly great preacher appears he will draw the people, irrespective of denominational lines. If the church is to command the respect she should, she must have men who above all know God. "But she must have men who shall hold preaching as the highest and most difficult art, who shall not be lazy or insincere, who shall bend themselves to its attainment." \*

\**Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

\*Kennedy, *op. cit.* p. 3.

\*Hoyt, A. S., *The Work of Preaching*, p. 19.

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# Social Science Seeks Enlightenment

Samuel Richey Kamm

Our social sciences are seeking a new orientation. For roughly three hundred years the scholars in these fields of knowledge have been pursuing the truth in the intellectual squirrel cage of scientific thought. It was Thomas Hobbes, that wisp of a British mathematician, that started social scientists on the road to intellectual and moral frustration. By his emphasis upon the primacy of the hedonistic individual and the method of rational science he turned the intellectual world upside down. From that time forth men were to abandon the canons of thought which rested upon faith in a sovereign God and to substitute in their place a faith in a sovereign universe.

The effects of this naturalistic orientation were not immediately evident. Few men saw the results of transferring the foundations of their thought from the *premises* of Augustine to those of Descartes and Hobbes. Writers such as Locke lived in the pattern of the strictest Puritan but thought in the language of the urbane pagan. What would happen when the "salt" of the Christian assumptions had lost its "savor" and only the sanctions of the rationalized concept of past experience remained? Only the excesses of the late eighteenth century revolutions and the disasters of the early twentieth century holocausts could tell.

It may appear to some that this is a far-fetched observation. Few students of the social sciences realize that the basic assumptions of any science of society are consonant with the total culture of which they are a part.<sup>1</sup> A hasty review of the history of social thought reveals the fact that the social science of the classical

world was cast in the mold of the reflective sciences of that cultural period. Herodotus cannot be adequately understood apart from the work of Thales and Heraclitus, nor can Thucydides be properly appreciated unless studied in the light of Hippocrates and Galen. Aristotle, also, drew inspiration from these sources. The Christian publicists leaned heavily upon Plato's *Timaeus* as well as the cosmology of the Hebrew Scriptures for their social epistemology.<sup>2</sup>

The mediaeval world witnessed a growing fission between a culture viewed within the Christian framework of ideas and that prehended through the scientific framework brought to life in the renaissance of classical culture. Aquinas endeavored to weld these conflicting orientations into a universal synthesis which offered to create a new framework for the social thought of the West. Marsiglio of Padua gave warning in the fourteenth century that the union could not be permanent. Luther and Calvin strove to lead the Western world back to thoroughly Christian presuppositions. But by the seventeenth century Hobbes had frankly renounced all revelational elements in his framework of thought and had launched boldly upon an attempt to place social science within the framework of the natural sciences of the Greeks. In so doing he chose to divorce social thought in the West from the great presuppositions which had been the foundation for all social thinkers for over a millenium.

Nature now became the deity of the Western world. All of the creative attributes of the God of the Hebrew-Christian system were transferred to that hypostasis of the natural universe known as Nature.

<sup>1</sup>R. S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1939), 116

<sup>2</sup>C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1944), 458-459, 469-471.

The universe was presumed to be mechanistic in operation, mathematical in composition, and geometric in design. God could be understood perfectly by understanding Nature. Man could be identified only as a part of Nature. Society was the creation of man in harmony with the laws of Nature. Hence, if one would know society and the social life of man he must erect a "social physics," that is, a science of society based upon a study of the "natural laws" of society.

The fruit of this endeavor is to be found in the work of Comte, Marx and Spencer in the nineteenth century. Two of these men, Comte and Marx, deserve special mention. The first is to be noted for his popularization of positivism as the method of science. In this system scientific study was held to deal only with the attributes of things revealed to the senses through observation and classification. The generalizations thus developed were held to be scientific laws upon which a science of society could be erected. When once constructed this body of science would grant prevision to men and thus enable human leaders to plan public policy with a greater degree of accuracy and efficiency. Comte was seeking for a basis of ideological unity in the Western world. He thought that he had found it in the directly observable phenomena of social life. These data, inductively perceived and classified, would be recognizable by all because a part of their experience. Positive truth would then be the ideological framework of Western culture.

Comte's importance as a scientific philosopher has long since been diminished by the more mature observations of other scholars. The fact that Comte discouraged the use of microscopes and instruments of precise measurement in scientific investigation, because they brought to light data not immediately discernable to the layman and thereby upset his plan to use only that data within the observation of all, has thrown suspicion upon his character as a scientist. When it is also known that Comte repudiated many of his ideas concerning the validity of human reason and

scientific truth as set forth in *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (Paris, 1830-1842), and that he boldly returned to the metaphysical basis of thinking in his *System of Positive Polity* (1851-1854)) it is to be recognized that Comte had serious misgivings about the validity of his whole system.<sup>3</sup> Yet his early advocacy of a science of society, which he first called social physics and later (1838) sociology, remains as part of our culture as well as his insistence upon the inductive methods of observation then employed in the physical sciences as the only legitimate approach to the study of social phenomena. In fact, it can safely be affirmed that Comte's vision of a social science that would bring predictive control within the hand of man is still the motivating spirit of social scientists today. Gunnar Myrdal, the noted Swedish social scientist, has recently declared:

The rationalism and moralism which is the driving force behind social study .... is the faith that institutions can be improved and strengthened and that people are good enough to live a happier life ... To find the practical formulas for this never-ending reconstruction of society is the supreme task of social science. .... We have today in social science a greater trust in the improbability of man and society that we have ever had since the Enlightenment.<sup>4</sup>

The work of Karl Marx is still more interesting as an example of the interaction between the science of the nineteenth century and social theory. Marx is usually associated with Hegel because of his use of the dialectical mode in his treatment of materialistic influences in the universe. Hegel, it will be remembered, employed a form of dialectical idealism; Marx shifted the emphasis to a dialectical materialism. What is not often recognized in Marx' insistence upon the primacy of materialistic forces is his debt to classical and modern science. Marx was a very careful student of ancient philosophy. His

<sup>3</sup>*System of Positive Polity* (London, 1875-1877), I, 341.

<sup>4</sup>Gunnar Myrdal, *The American Dilemma* (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944), II, 1024.

doctoral dissertation at the University of Jena was entitled, "The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Natural Philosophy."<sup>1</sup> His familiarity with the Greek philosophers enabled him to discover the original sources of Hegel's dialectic in the dialectical materialism of Heraclitus. He, therefore, repudiated the idealistic application of Hegel for the materialistic thesis of the original and in so doing made Hegel appear as if standing on his head.<sup>2</sup>

The presuppositions of Heraclitus had been highly refined by the nineteenth century scientists. Early in the century Sadi Carnot, (1796-1832) the brilliant French physicist, had developed the principle known as the second law of thermodynamics. A few years later Rudolf Clausius (1822-1888) amplified this general principle into a scientific theory by an elaborate series of tests and observations. His idea that the molecules in electrolytes are continually interchanging atoms became popularized as the Clausian theory of entropy. By the terms of this system the whole universe was conceived as in the process of continuous change. The static view of the world as sustained by natural law was thrown into the discard as no longer tenable. With it went the whole body of social theory which had been based upon those presuppositions. A search for dynamic or changing concepts followed. Darwin seized upon the concept of eternal struggle as the motivating factor for change in the natural universe. His *Origin of Species* which appeared in 1859 served as an inspiration to Marx and aided him in formulating a social theory built more directly upon the Clausian base.<sup>3</sup>

These influences are directly observable in Marx' insistence upon the principle of

continuous change in human society and his refusal to deal with men as individuals.<sup>4</sup> Men were to be studied collectively. To do otherwise was to view them as something other than men. It was the collective experience of men that formed the basis for empirical study. Men thought and acted in association with each other within the framework of a material universe analogous to that within which the atom or molecule existed. Men were subject to the same material forces, impersonal in nature and therefore subject to empirical observation and classification. The "dialectic" of human life in society was not looked upon as cause in the ontological sense. It was, says Vernon, "the formal structure of material processes whose particular content, direction and tempo can be determined only by empirical examination."<sup>5</sup>

Engels expressed the Marxian view very clearly when he wrote in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*: "...the conflict of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produces a state of affairs entirely analogous to that in the realm of unconscious nature. The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from these actions are not intended... Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws."<sup>6</sup>

The importance of the Marxian influence upon social theory cannot be minimized. Its professed adherence to the canons of physical science has won for it a place in Western culture out of all proportion to its validity as a scientific system of thought.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, it has passed from the realm of science to the realm of faith. Appearing now in the gospel of Communism it threatens to enthrall the entire

<sup>1</sup>Chester Maxey, *Political Philosophies* (Macmillan, New York, 1938), 567; Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1948, second edition), 78.

<sup>2</sup>C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, fn423.

<sup>3</sup>Vernon Venable, *Human Natures The Marxian View* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1945), 14-15.

<sup>4</sup>Vernon Venable, *op. cit.*, 13-14

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>6</sup>Cited in Robert P. Casey, *Religion in Russia*, (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1946) 73-74.

<sup>7</sup>Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1928) 527-546.

Eastern and Western world.<sup>22</sup> And all of this in spite of the fact that both history and science have raised questions as to the validity of its predictions. History has demonstrated that the class struggle does not always result in the destruction of the entrepreneur and the elevation of the proletariat. Science has concluded since the announcement of the principle of indeterminacy by Heisenberg in 1927 that prediction is indeterminate in character for the atomic universe. Planck's more and recent discovery that natural forces are not continuous tends to throw doubt upon the whole concept of a teleological dialectic. In a word, scientific theory has deserted the Marxian hypothesis, leaving his social theory bereft of its entire system of constructs.

The fate of Marxian social theory is the fate of all social theory which is tied to the epistemology of the physical sciences. The whole concept of uniformity in the natural world, which formed the basic presupposition for order and law in the social world, is now swept away. The idea of law derived through empirical observation is now admitted to be at best a statistical average.<sup>23</sup> Scientific prediction has moved from the realm of the absolute to that of the relative or probable. In effect, all that we may assert to be scientific truth in the social realm is verified historical experience. We can never claim universally predictable validity for our hypotheses in the realm of social science any more than we can claim such for the field of the physical sciences.

A number of social scientists are today calling for a reorientation of this field of inquiry. Gunnar Myrdal in his recent study of the Negro in America challenges student of society to clarify their position as scientific investigators and interpreters. He lays particular stress upon the importance

of recognizing certain *a priori* assumptions in one's work (a position that has been bitterly contested by all of the followers of Comte and Dewey), and the necessity of clarifying and defining the terms and concepts used in research. He makes bold to assert that social scientists are dealing with thinking human beings and that the prevailing climate of opinion is an important scientific datum in analyzing human behavior.<sup>24</sup> Robert M. MacIver of Columbia University has coined the phrase "dynamic assessment" to focus attention upon the fact that men make decisions leading to action within a framework of environmental influences which included not only the social and technological order but the cultural order which embraces the realm of ideas in traditions, faith and philosophies.<sup>25</sup> Others such as Robert S. Lynd of *Middletown* fame are in revolt against the enslavement of the social sciences to the empirical method of the physical sciences. He believes that the method leads to the arbitrary exclusion of pertinent data from the field of observation.<sup>26</sup>

A few of our modern social scientists have made bold to adopt a new viewpoint for the study of man. Pitrim Sorokin of Harvard University has frankly rejected the limited universal of the natural science approach. He has endeavored to recognize within the existing culture various orders of truth including that of religious faith. By so doing he has again admitted to the scope of scientific consciousness the reality of spiritual power which transcends that of either the mind or the senses. He endeavors to interpret culture in reference to norms that are "given" and not empirically derived from a set of circumstances. For Sorokin the motion of men in society is not that of mechanical regularity, but one of fluctuation. There is no movement of linear or cyclical progress as long advocated by adherents to the various

<sup>22</sup> Cesar Barja, "The Outlook for European Culture:I," in *The Outlook for Postwar Europe* (University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1945), 84-85.

<sup>23</sup> A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, (Macmillan, New York, 1928) 98.

<sup>24</sup> *An American Dilemma*, II, Appendix 2, pp. 1032-1057.

<sup>25</sup> *Social Causation*, (Ginn and Company, New York, 1942), 271-274.

<sup>26</sup> *Knowledge for What?* 123-125.



scientific traditions."

Arnold Toynbee, the English historian, has employed a similar orientation in his prodigious study of twenty-six civilizations. For Toynbee the pattern of motion in societies is one of challenge and response both to the physical and social environment and to the problems involved in successfully conducting the civilization produced.<sup>18</sup> He denies the organic character of civilizations, which is an attempt to identify the life of men with that of biological organisms, and substitutes therefor a set of relations existing between living men in a given society at a particular moment in history. By accepting the world view of Augustine and the early Christian publicists

he projects his findings against a background which views God as an active agent in the universe.<sup>19</sup>

This break with naturalistic presuppositions in the social sciences is one of the most challenging developments in our day.<sup>20</sup> It opens the way for a reconsideration of the problems of our time in the light of the Christian revelation. Within the scope of these newer approaches to the problems of man the Christian doctrines of sin and redemption have real meaning. They open the door in a new way to the application of the Gospel to the amelioration of human problems in our time.

<sup>18</sup>H. E. Barnes, *op cit.*, 717-736; *Time*, March 17, 1947, 71-79.

<sup>19</sup>Hans Speier, "The Sociological Ideas of Pitirim Alexandrovitch Sorokin. 'Integralist' Sociology" in H. E. Barnes, *et al*, *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, 884-900.

<sup>20</sup>Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1948), 3-15.

<sup>21</sup>See Kenneth Scott Latourette, "The Christian Understanding of History," *American Historical Review*, LIV: 259-276, for a recent presentation of the Christian view of history as the working framework of one of America's most distinguished historians.



# Modern Science And Values

CARL F. H. HENRY

There is a very efficient device for bruising the intimate feelings of a scientist. If one were to advise him that science is a valueless pursuit, and that his laboratory techniques are good for nothing, the scientist would be quickly propelled out of that state of depersonalized objectivity which he so prizes in experimentation.

The reason for so spirited a reaction is plain enough. About the value of science the scientist has no doubt at all, however indifferent he may be to the broader question of objective values. He will not yield to the notion that the scientific endeavor is without worth. In an atomic age the one valuable thing, he may even think, is the pursuit of scientific inquiry; whether there are eternal and unchangeable moral norms or values may be a matter for cloistered dispute, but the value of science is indisputable.

And yet it was precisely modern science which at the beginning of our generation insisted in uncompromised terms that it has no dealings with an eternal, unchanging moral and spiritual order. Almost all standard scientific works were marked, as a characteristic feature, by the absence of reference to values or ends for the sake of which reality exists or ought to exist. They assumed either that no such realm of purpose and value exists, or that, if it does, the scientist knows nothing about it. One could gaze through a microscope into Herbert Spencer's tightly-printed books, but he would search in vain for interactions with the sphere of the good and of the holy. The adaptations, cohesions and integrations which interested Spencer were not of a moral and spiritual kind. Julian Huxley expressed the dominant mood pithily when he wrote that science is "morally and emotionally neutral" (in *Science and Religion*, p 18).

But no scientist has a right to assume the *value of science* unless he becomes explicit about the *science of values*. Huxley merely begged the question when he remarked that "the only value which it (science) recognizes is that of truth and knowledge" (*ibid.*, p. 18) For during military combat the science of censorship has demonstrated that truth may often be less valuable than falsehood, and the value of knowledge can hardly be demonstrated within the limited scope of empirical tentativity, with its constant demand for revising all conclusions. The value of science depends upon the science of values. If there is no objective good then science is not objectively good for anything. If there are no abiding values, then science has no abiding value. If good and evil are artificial or tentative distinctions, then whenever men declare that science is "good for" something they may equally well assert it to be "bad for" the same thing. Science is a valueless and worthless endeavor if it operates in a sphere in which value and worth are without a home. We must either admit values, and talk of science, or debar values, and cease to assume the value of science.

The scientist has an immediate retort to this kind of argument. Science can have value and can be good for much, he contends, without any necessary commitment to an eternal and abiding moral and spiritual realm. The real value of science, he says, is that it helps us to make an effective adjustment.

It should be noted that the scientist has no right at this point to any qualifying adjective suggestive of ethical distinctions; he must not, that is, speak of a *better* or *higher* or *proper* adjustment, because these all imply a scale of values. But then, why is it good that we be aided

in making an effective adjustment? If the evolutionary process really moves on from simple to increasingly complex forms, why may it not involve the production of a supra-human species, destined to surpass man as man has surpassed the amoeba? What is the good of an adjustment in the interest of longevity? Or, what do we want to live longer *for*? Or, if the most effective adjustment in the interest of Soviet perpetuity should involve our sudden demolition, does not such an application of science fulfill the value of facilitating human adjustment?

Sometimes it is assumed that, rather than eternal and changeless values, all that is necessary for an ethical civilization is a continuity of meaning for a generation at a time. The false optimism which underlies this sort of thought is easily unmasked. When does the generation begin and where does it end? Usually it is assumed by such theorists that the generation of which they speak begins with their birthdate and ends with their demise—a convenient personal mode of dating to the neat chronology of which the prevailing ideologies do not readily accommodate themselves. It remains that if what is good today may become evil tomorrow the door is ajar to the ethical relativism which openly declares that might is right. No ideology which makes value to mean simply what is most pleasant or most powerful, i. e., effective, can protest against naturalistic power politics.

The problem of values has been propelled into the laboratories of modern scientists by the international events of our times. It is crystal clear now that science can be combined with a naturalistic as well as an idealistic or a theistic outlook on life, and that atomic energy can be employed to make men slaves or to make them free. On the one hand, we are told by supernaturalists that national fitness to survive is in terms of values integral to Christian culture, in contrast with the older civilizations of China, India and the Middle East, or of the new civilization of the Soviet. P. A. Sorokin warns us that ethical relativism has reach-

ed its maximum in our times, and that the reduction of value to individual fancy is a sign of "mental and moral anarchy" which, if not halted, can lead only to "complete disintegration or mummification." On the other hand, naturalists like Harry Elmer Barnes condemn supernaturalistic ethics, equating its chief interest with a puritanical sex life and an auspicious entry into the hereafter. The moral code necessary for survival, Barnes contends, must be founded not upon religion and revelation, but upon the natural and social sciences.

Here, clearly, are two vastly different views. In the one case, values are assumed to be eternal and unchanging; the good is not something made in Japan, nor Russia, nor even in the United States. In the other case, it is assumed that no supernatural realm exists, but that values are simply ideals, subject to revision, projected by man in his continuing effort to master his environment.

Modern science has vacillated between these alternatives. Nineteenth and twentieth century science exhibit a most remarkable contrast in their respective attitudes toward the objectivity of values.

Nineteenth century physics, except in its higher agnostic moments, was committed to a view of the universe which assigned to moral, aesthetic and religious values only a subjective status, to a view which denied an objectively real moral and religious consciousness as illusory. The reason advanced by nineteenth century physics for this attitude is well known even to vast multitudes not skilled in the subtleties of philosophy. To be real, asserted the physics of two generations ago, an object had to be visible and tangible; all else belonged to the realm of phantasy and goblin, or was at best a matter of faith without a knowledge basis. The content of knowledge was limited to the data of sensation. The only reality known to science, we were told, is phenomenal, and is subject to mechanical causation which tolerates no exceptions; all else—God, moral norms, the inner sense of moral or religious obligation -- belongs to the mythological or postu-

lational, as the spiritual was rebaptised by contemporary naturalism. Physics was wedded to the naturalistic bias with all the authority that many influential scientists could muster. The impression was carried in academic centers that one had to take his choice either be scientific or religious, but not both—until the cleavage between religion and science had been made all but absolute.

The case for that sort of a universe, in which any God, or any soul, or any moral norm, had to have a subjective reality, was never proved by nineteenth century physics, else more recent thought would not have found it so repugnant. The science of the end of the century had not demonstrated that the spiritual is unreal, any more than it proved that reality must be seeable and touchable; it had no method for dealing with any realities other than the natural, and consequently was incompetent to deliver a judgment with regard to them. The physics of the day assumed - under the sway of phenomenalism - that reality must be *sehsate*, and in consequence of this assumption, it denied the reality of the spiritual and moral.

Revolutionary changes in thought have carried contemporary science a long distance from that mechanical, block-type universe of the nineteenth century. Today physicists on every hand insist that the most real things are invisible. The space-time universe has undergone transsubstantiation. The real world is not, we are told, the familiar world of persons and places, neither the chairs on which we sit, nor the floor on which we stand, nor the things we see and touch. Rather, the real world is invisible, a world of atoms and electrons eluding the human eye, and not subject to that strict mechanical causal uniformity upon which the physics of the past generation insisted. The nature of the real world is not visible and touchable; the visible and touchable are not as ultimately real as the invisible and untouchable. The real world is permeated not with strict causal continuity, but - as far as we know it, at least - with a liberal discontinuity. Since there is an objectively real world

which is invisible, twentieth century physics does not arbitrarily rule out the possibility of an ultimate moral and spiritual order; neither God, nor values, nor the dictates of the religious and ethical consciousness need be explained away as illusory. So we hear much of the new tolerance of science for religion and morality.

In fact, philosophical physicists like Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans assert that the universe known to twentieth century physics finds its best explanation in the view that reality is the thought of a divine Mind. They emphasize that the scientific method does not reach far enough to rule upon this issue; no thinker can say, as a scientist, that there is no objective moral and spiritual order, for his methodology is too limited to make a pronouncement in this realm. Since the scientific method carries us not to reality, but only to that point from which the ultimate, invisible reality is inferred, these scientists hold that the correct inference is to an objective Mind, rather than to mere nonmental events, or to the mechanical block universe of a half-century ago. The invisible real world, they contend, is not merely a scheme of symbols connected by mathematical formulae, but rather, is a mathematical Thinker.

It would be short-sighted indeed to regard men like Eddington and Jeans as essentially in the Christian tradition because of their proclamations here. For, since the scientific method does not reach to ultimate reality, these scholars do not speak as scientists when they declare for an ultimate Mind, any more than other scientists speak as scientists when they declare against theism in favor of naturalism. The very point of departure is the confession of the inability of the scientific method to pronounce on the issue of theism and of objective morality. Just because a scientist turns metaphysician, there is no reason for assigning to his works a veneration greater than that due the works of a metaphysic alert to scientific discoveries. Scientists have sometimes declared for an objective spiritual and moral order in a profoundly non-Christian sense, and that

in the very name of Christianity. The new emphasis that matter and spirit may not be as foreign to each other as once thought, should not obscure the Christian conviction that the being of the universe is not the being of God, any more than the indeterminacy of the atom should obscure the Biblical doctrine of the particular providence of God. That a man is a specialist in science does not give him any special qualification for pronouncing on the nature of ultimate reality. He displays the true scientific spirit when he emphasizes that his methodology cannot possibly settle the issue one way or the other, not when, in the name of science, he comes out for or against an objective moral or spiritual order. The issue is not determined by the scientific method, and the consequences must be applied in both directions. The declarations of Eddington and Jeans in the interest of an idealistic interpretation of the universe, insisting that the proper inference from the data of science is to a creative Mind and not simply to an objective mathematical order, are not to be worshipped because they come from physicists, for they are among the first to remind us that physics is impotent to determine the question. The merit of their insistence upon a supreme creative Mind and upon the objectivity of values turns on other factors, and on these factors scientists have no monopoly. Indeed, if anything, science in recent generations has disclosed a poverty of interest in the crucial and relevant facts which are determinative in this regard.

Within the restrictions of modern science, the scientist cannot say that there is an objective moral and spiritual order; he can say only that he cannot declare that these are merely subjective. That is not to say that the scientist needs to be, nor that he should be, agnostic about spiritual verities. The testimony of scientists to the objectivity of values is not important because they are scientists, but because they combine intelligent thought about the super-scientific world with intelligent thought about the scientific. When a scientist declares for an objectively real super-

natural order, he provides evidence that a scientist who scores one hundred in physics need not on that account score zero in metaphysics.

Curiously, while indoctrinating the academic world in the unrivaled effectiveness of scientific methodology to deliver us from mythology and superstition, much of the science of yesterday placed itself at the service-erroneously, as admitted today-of a most specious sort of mythology. By converting its methodology into a metaphysics, it ended up with a block universe without any possibility of an objective moral and spiritual order. That was a fictitious world, even if proffered in the name of science. A methodology which requires the *a priori* dismissal of God as only a projection of fancy, and of all ethical codes as the mere voice of tradition, discloses more about its own limitations, than it does about the nature of religion and morality.

Contemporary thought is coming now to see that because Bertrand Russell is a genius in the realm of mathematics, he has no right to reduce sex to sheer mathematical rhythm, that because Robert Millikan is an illustrious physicist, his view of human nature need not be considered profound when he declares that war has survived simply because it has survival value; that because Albert Einstein is a brilliant physicist, he is not on that account an authority when he declares that ethical behavior requires no support from religion.

The great turning point in modern scientific attitudes is the recognition that the scientific method does not afford us the exclusive access to truth. The great ages of philosophy entertained hardly a doubt about the serious limitations of a sensory methodology. The classic Greek outlook, the medieval world view, and the rationalistic philosophers from Descartes to Hegel were agreed that, were knowledge a product of sensation alone, the whole quest for truth must be abandoned. Even the early modern empirical philosophers, Locke and Berkeley, believed in much more than they saw. But nineteenth century physics held that the scientific



method provided the sole avenue to truth, and by so doing reduced reality in intent to the world of nature. The upheaval due to the newer physics is so remarkable, in contrast with the naturalism of two generations ago, that C. E. M. Joad does not hesitate to declare that "so far an English and American scientists are concerned, the leaders seem almost unanimously to disown any exclusive claim on the part of science to give us information about the nature of reality".<sup>1</sup>

If the scientific method then gives us but an abstracted view of reality, so that by necessity it does not deal with such realities as God and the moral order, the question arises, why a paper on "Modern Science and Values"? The reply is simple. This is a gathering, in the main, of scientists, and it is one thing to hold that the scientific method has proper limitations, and another thing to say that a scientist is a man who limits himself so as to have nothing to do with deity and morality.<sup>2</sup>

Precisely at this juncture the science of yesterday contributed disastrously to the moral paralysis of our times. It was not from the scientist of that day that we got much hint of the reality of the supernatural; it was not from the scientist that we got much encouragement for the belief in the objectivity of values; it was not by the scientist that we were taught that man is essentially more than an animal. Whether the scientist's silence was due to unbelief, or due to the inability of his restricted methodology to deal with these issues, did not affect the general outcome, which was the impression that a man who specializes in scientific things has to be indifferent to religion and morality. The scientific mood seemed to be that, simply because he concentrates within an abstracted method, the scientist has to cut himself off in his thought and life and pronouncement from

anything outside that method and by so doing, the scientist of recent generations nourished the false dogma that the scientific method is the avenue to truth, and that the world of nature is the ultimate real. The undisputed fact that major discoveries are made by the scientific method came to mean, in such an atmosphere, that nothing significant is to be learned by divine revelation. That the scientific method was agnostic about values came to imply that the scientist must be, at most, agnostic about them.

Because of this failure to insist upon the objective reality of a spiritual and moral order, the average scientist has become one of the most curious figures of the mid-twentieth century. Indicating by his personal example that a truly scientific attitude involves silence about spiritual and moral realities, the scientist, confronted in an atom bomb age by world peril due to the "might is right" relativism of the Soviet, suddenly pleads for an alertness to the moral implications of scientific discoveries. Yet, in company with other influences, it was scientism that discouraged alertness to an objective morality; it was scientism which encouraged indifference to religion and ethics, by a preoccupation with the world of nature, to which man was absorbed. This engrossment with nature helped to substitute a false means of salvation for the salvation which the prophets and apostles and Jesus Christ proclaimed. The deepest reason for the modern man's hope became evolution, or scientific methodology, or some other alternative to Biblical redemption. In contrast to the Scriptural ideal of man's dominion over nature, impossible of proper actualization apart from the redemptive work of God, modern science held forth the ideal of a conquest of nature without any reference to man's moral and spiritual regeneration. Thus it obscured ends in the quest for means. There was no intention of glorifying God in the pagan subduction of nature. Where the New Testament has asserted that "we see not yet all things in subjection to man . . . but we see Jesus," the scientific texts emphasized only what can be seen through

<sup>1</sup>*Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science* p. 189.

<sup>2</sup>This paper was delivered at the fourth annual convention of the American Scientific Affiliation in Los Angeles, California, August 25, 1949.



microscopes and telescopes, or rather, the inference from such data, and often quite fallacious inferences at that. Spiritual and moral factors were lost in the search for quantitative techniques. Modern science came to espouse a false soteriology and thus widened the gulf between the twentieth century and Biblical Christianity. The divorce from the Hebrew-Christian revelation hastened the modern descent to relativity in morals. The whole naturalistic movement from the Renaissance to our times has issued in a naturalistic ethics which has been the undermining of all ethics.

The challenge to the contemporary scientist is that he declares, as unequivocally as he proclaims the relevance of the scientific method, the relevance of some super-scientific method, and that he consider himself under a supreme obligation to pursue super-scientific truth as devotedly as he pursues restricted scientific truth.<sup>1</sup> No accumulation of ethical seminars by distinguished scientists touches the problem, while the rupture with the sufficiency of scientific method is half-hearted. Atomic physics may refine sense perception, teaching us that reality is uncritically manifested to sensation, but it is no wedge at all for the admission of value areas which cannot be manifested—even uncritically—in the stuff with which laboratories deal; the reality of values turns on the acknowledgment of a method competent to deal with them. The open-mindedness which cheerfully grants that the scientific method cannot rule out the possibility of God and eternal values, might as significantly grant the possibility of transparent ghost writers and two-headed snarks on the other side of Mars. Open-

minedness on such issues means nothing, while there is no clear cut statement of the right of another method to deal with the spiritual and moral aspects of reality. No plea merely for the priority of the social sciences over the physical sciences is adequate, for social psychology, economics and sociology can be used for evil as well as for good ends. What we need is a method which deals with ends, with values, with an *ought*. If there is no such method, then scientific agnosticism is the last word. If there is, then to stop with scientific agnosticism is a crime against humanity, for the worth of man turns upon the validity of certain values quite apart from subjective preference and opinion.

The scientific method, as the moderns define it, is not a method to deal with the *ought*; it is an abstracted device for dealing with the *is*, and, indeed, for dealing only with the phenomenal *is*. Great traditions in world thought prior to modern sensationalism considered it a tragic mistake to think only of a science of phenomenal realities. They spoke of the science of nature; they recognized the existence of normative, no less than of descriptive sciences. No merely descriptive observation of nature and man will ever carry one beyond the *is* to the *ought*. Therefore the scientist who pleads for a renewed interest in morality, but who remains in bondage to scientism, will never get beyond the affirmation that a certain course of action is preferable because it is most pleasant or because it appears to work. He will never rise to the requirement of a true morality, with its insistence that the good must be done because it is objectively good.

It is not insisted that the scientist must, in the midst of every scientific investigation, raise the question of ultimate values—as though he has no right to peer through his telescope until he has exhausted the ethical implications of the particular experiment. An obstetrician charged with delivery of an infant would hardly be forgiven for interrupting his duties to write a volume on vicarious suffering. But to convert this necessity for scientific

<sup>1</sup>If the objects of theological and philosophical study are genuine, there is no compunction to limit the term "scientific method" to sensationalistic inductionism. The widening of objective reality involves the widening also of scientific methodology. From this viewpoint, it is quite unscientific arbitrarily to restrict the term to a small segment of reality which, as a whole, can be systematically explored. But the term is used here in its recent limited sense, by way of accommodation.

diligence into a total indifference to values is quite another thing.

Nor, because we insist upon ultimates which are beyond change and flux, and upon which the whole scientific endeavor finally rests if it is to make sense, are we to be charged with complete abandonment of any realm of probability and revision. That there is a realm of technics, which is most competent to deal by direct examination and research with certain areas of reality, reaching conclusions which are subject to constant empirical revision, is not at all beyond dispute, as long as the interpretations yielded by such a method are clearly labeled as partial explanations, abstracted for specific uses, and not dealing with the question of purpose, nor minimizing that the *why* is in the long run of greater significance than the *what*.

Science affords us a view of things which is only partially coherent, and which therefore reaches beyond itself for intelligibility. This is true not only of the conclusions of science, but also of the very premises with which it sets out. As to the conclusions, it is a frustrating and self-defeating statement of human nature, and one which can issue only in pessimism, which fixes upon man as a speck of animated stellar dust and leaves suspended in mid-air his deepest hopes and fears involving a relationship to a real but unseen spiritual order; science does not make room for the scientist, in his most intimate personal experiences, on such an approach. As to the initial assumptions, science cannot even get underway without a commitment to those basic moral obligations upon which all knowledge depends, such as the intrinsic superiority of honesty over dishonesty, of objectivity over caprice in experimentation, as well as the broad assumptions of the intelligibility of the universe and of the value of truth as against superstition. The whole scientific enterprise is robbed of coherence if the shadow of moral and rational relativity is cast over these primary postulates.

What is clearly needed is a method which retains meaning for all the valid elements of human experience. No appeal

simply to a philosophic method, nor to a revelational method, is self-sufficient, for philosophic methods are legion and competing revelation-claims must likewise be tested. We must not abandon crucial areas of human experience to unrelieved paradox, but rather, rise to that coherence which retains significance for every legitimate aspect of life and history. The fact that some philosophers in the name of coherence, have settled for idealistic and sub-Christian interpretations of reality need not trouble the Christian, as long as he can press the case that the coherence of the facts of science, values, and of God is more profound and complex than the truncated coherence which is sometimes preferred. Just as science, within the arbitrarily fixed limits of its methodology, cannot attain to more than a partial understanding of its data, so too the attempt to make room for an objective spiritual and moral order does not attain a fully coherent expression apart from a proper centrality for that special divine revelation centering in the Hebrew-Christian scriptures and fulfilled in Jesus Christ. A view of existence which asserts an abiding truth and goodness makes room for its own affirmations about scientific phenomena, but it is not so coherent as a view which is alert to special divine revelation, for that alone affords a compelling theistic framework to underwrite the objectivity of genuine religious and moral encounter.

In the recovery of morality, scientists today bear a heavy responsibility. As they conveyed to the modern world the impression that scientific discoveries have overthrown Biblical supernaturalism, they must now contend with equal vitality—if they are in earnest about super-scientific knowledge—for the relevance of that same objective spiritual and moral order which once they denied. That is not an easy task. For one thing, scientism spurred the cultural descent to naturalism, but the scientist by themselves cannot spur a cultural ascent to Christian conviction. Much more in the way of personal spiritual encounter and decision is involved in such an ex-

change. The overthrow of relativistic expediency in the interest of Biblical morality is not a reversal to which humanity is naturally inclined. Furthermore, the abandonment of the optimistic notion of the essential goodness of man may be made to yield as much comfort to naturalism as to Biblical theism. If man is no longer, at the core of his being, to be viewed as a minor deity, is the dominance of brute impulses to be interpreted along the pattern of man's essential animality? That is a crucial question today, and the whole movement of recent science has not formulated any unambiguous case for man's essential super-animality.

The case for an objective morality cannot be separated today, any more that it was in the early Christian ages, from the issue of divine revelation. There is only one effective alternative to the illusion of man's animality, as also to the illusion of his essential deity, and that is that man is a sinner. He is not a miniature God, but he is a creature made in the image of the holy Lord of the universe. He is not an animal, but he is a fallen sinner in revolt against his Maker, and is morally responsible for his defection. That is the proclamation of revealed religion. In the Hebrew-Christian scriptures alone is God self-disclosed as the ultimate source of our moral distinctions, and as so holy that he does not gloss over the sinfulness of man. He is so holy that he neither overlooks sin, nor accepts the best offerings of tarnished hands and hearts as the equivalent of the divine standard of holiness. He declares instead that man cannot save him-

self, so radical is the plight of fallen humanity, yet that God in sovereign mercy promises and provides in Christ that alone sufficient salvation.

That view of objective holiness alone stands in sufficient judgment upon the moral complacency of modern man, reacting to sin with a high cosmic seriousness. There alone is found the offer of a redemptive dynamic sufficient to lift man beyond egoistic and destructive impulses. There alone is the message which, if made the context for the modern scientific pursuit, will enable scientism to redeem the time which it has spent in undermining the relevance of Christian supernaturalism and the moral demand of reality upon men's minds and hearts.

There is no effective plea for an objective morality, except in terms of the divine revelation spoken by God to man. It is because God has spoken that we know ourselves at once as objects of His creative and of His redemptive love. It is as we acknowledge our sinfulness and our need of His mercy that we come to experience God as the supreme value of life, and as the source of changeless moral norms.

That may not be a message with which modern science is primarily concerned, but unless the modern scientist makes it a primary concern, he cannot escape delivering our age to barbarism and despair. Indifference to essential Christianity means indifference to values, and indifference to values will sooner or later clearly imply the valuelessness of science in the most significant areas of human life.

# *Alumni Letter*

DEE W. COBB

As students in increasing numbers pour into the halls of Asbury Seminary, and the list of our alumni is constantly increasing, we are made more and more aware of the growing importance of the work of the Alumni Association. Institutions like Asbury Seminary, which are not supported by any denomination, nor richly endowed by any philanthropist, must naturally turn to its alumni for that kind of solid backing which will advertise the school before the general public, and thus often prove effective in turning some of God's money into this channel, if it is to build a school which can promptly receive those clamoring for admission and adequately equip them to go out and serve our needy world.

That is the reason we need a strong Alumni Association. In the years ahead the strength of the Seminary will be determined in a large measure by the strength of the Alumni Association. We need not only the strength of numbers; we need the strength of unity, the strength of a group solidly welded together in the bonds of Christian fellowship and in a great loyalty to the school which means so much to us. The old alibi of importance, "What can one person do?" is still being sounded by many people in our world who simply don't want to do anything. At the same time it is being demonstrated again and again that "one person" can often do some astounding things when he sets himself to the job. Some of our individual alumni are proving that to be true. If big things can be done by these singly, how much more ought we as an Association to be able to do.

There is no denying that the Seminary is definitely on the upgrade. God is prospering. His Spirit is leading. If we will continue to pray and give and advertise, soon we shall have a seminary second to none. We believe this to be a laudable objective.

Be sure to plan to attend Ministers' Conference. A number of vital matters will face your Board of Directors in their meeting at that time. So pray for us, and feel free to express yourself on matters of Alumni business at any time.



# "Civilization On Trial"

An Appraisal by  
DUVON C. CORBITT

Members of the historical fraternity approach the writings of Professor Arnold J. Toynbee in the spirit of the Apostle Peter: "Brother Paul . . . hath written some things hard to be understood." The sentiment has been well expressed by the late Dr. Charles A. Beard in a review of vols. V and VI of Toynbee's *A Study of History*:

It is highly doubtful whether any scholar in America, or any other part of the world, could control and check the enormous number of references to personalities, theories, events, and facts scattered through many centuries and over a large part of the earth's surface. Nor will it be easy for readers to discover the meaning of such matters as Mr. Toynbee's handling of contemporary communism in the light of the fate of other religious or philosophico-religious movements that have turned militant, for example, anti-Hellenic Judaism and Zoroastrianism of the Syriac world in the post-Alexandrine age or the militant Muslim-Hindu syncretistic religion of Sikhism. (*American Historical Review*, April, 1940, p. 594)

Dr. Beard put his finger on the principal difficulties when he added:

Any summary of Mr. Toynbee's findings, conclusions, or reflection for the purposes of review is bound to be inadequate. Nor is it easy to discover and set forth the spirit and method of his procedure. His erudition is immense; he ranges far and wide in time and space; he employs literature in many languages; and he indulges in metaphors which elude mere positivists. Some fragments of imaginative metaphysics underlie the structures of his chapters, but it is scarcely possible to make a system of these fragments; nor does it appear that the author has made up his own mind on the point of the ultimate design of the universe about which he is speaking at great length. His erudition and his metaphysics, combined with metaphorical language and use of analogies, give a peculiar and elusive character to the whole. There is nothing like it in the English tongue. For a comparison it is necessary to resort to such works as Spen-

gler's *Decline of the West* and Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. Yet Mr. Toynbee's erudition makes Spengler look like a petty sciolist, and his catholicity of thought makes Hegel's dogmatism sound like the scream of a Prussian drill sergeant (*Ibid.*, pp. 563-594)

It is the purpose of this article to survey Toynbee's latest volume, *Civilization on Trial* (Oxford University Press, 1948), which is something of a condensation of his larger work, with a view to discovery whether in his study as a whole he may have something to say which is relevant to our contemporary understanding, not only of history, but also of the deeper human problem which history objectifies.

Truly Professor Toynbee's erudition is immense. Beginning with the priceless heritage of a classical education, he has added to it wide, if not always deep, reading in the history of civilizations, religions, philosophies and nations. Much learning has not made him mad, but it has tempted him into formulating a philosophy - yea, both a philosophy and a theology - of history. He sees history repeating itself, not in specific events, but in a kind of cycle of birth, development and death of civilizations. Civilizations are born. If they meet challenges that are too great or too small, they become stagnant, or arrested. If, on the other hand, they meet those that are just right, they develop into universal civilizations before they disintegrate and give rise to other civilizations. In an early chapter of his recent collection of essays Professor Toynbee put his credo in these words:

Briefly stated, the regular pattern of social disintegration is a schism of the disintegrating society into a recalcitrant proletariat and a less and less effectively dominant minority. The process of disintegration does not proceed evenly; it jolts along in altering spasms of rout, rally,



and rout. In the last rally but one, the dominant minority succeeds in temporarily arresting society's lethal self-laceration by imposing on it the peace of a universal state. Within the framework of the dominant minority's universal state the proletariat creates a universal church, and after the next rout, in which the disintegrating civilization finally dissolves, the universal church may live on to become the chrysalis from which a new civilization eventually emerges. (*Civilization on Trial*, p.13)

But in a later chapter of the same collection he took issue with himself. One view of history, he thought, might consider Christianity, "as it were, the egg, grub, and chrysalis between butterfly and butterfly . . . a transitional thing which bridges the gap between one civilization and another." "I confess," he adds, "that I myself held this rather patronizing view for many years. (*Civilization on Trial*, p. 231) Then he explained his view: "There will be no reason to suppose that Christianity itself will be superseded by some distinct, separate, different higher religion which will serve as a chrysalis between our present Western civilization and the birth of its children." Rather "the truth is the other way round . . . civilization may break up, but the replacement of one higher religion by another will not be a necessary consequence. So far from that, if our secular Western Civilization perishes, Christianity may be expected not only to endure but to grow in wisdom and stature as a result of a fresh experience of secular catastrophe." Another suggestion is that "The Christian Church as an institution may be left as the social heir of all the other Churches and all the civilizations." (*Civilization on Trial*, pp. 238-240)

Theologians and perhaps most historians will find it easy to agree with this last prediction of Professor Toynbee, however much they may question the tortuous reasoning that led him to it. They will be interested in the question that he raises. If, when the ephemeral societies of the civilizations of the past six thousand years culminate in "a single worldwide and enduring representative in the shape of the Christian Church," "would

it mean that the Kingdom of Heaven would then have been established on Earth?" Toynbee's answer is an emphatic "No!" The "reason lies in the nature of society and in the nature of man." "Unless and until human nature itself undergoes a moral mutation which would make an essential change in its character, the possibility of evil as well as good will be born into the world afresh with every child and will never be wholly ruled out as long as one child remains alive. This is as much as to say that the replacement of a multiplicity of civilizations by a universal church would not have purged human nature of original sin." And, says Professor Toynbee, "this leads to another consideration: so long as original sin remains an element in human nature, Caesar will always have work to do and there will still be Caesar's things to be rendered to Caesar, as well as God's to God, in this world." (*Civilization on Trial*, pp. 240-241)

Critics can point out, and some have, errors of fact and interpretation that cast doubt on Professor Toynbee's "thesis of the parallelism, and philosophical contemporaneity of civilizations." Even novelist Kenneth Roberts has devastated the conclusions drawn from a comparison of Maine with other parts of New England. ("Don't Say that about Maine," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 6, 1948) Psychologist Abram Kardiner has been even more cutting in his analysis of Toynbee's "views and methods," (*Scientific American*, August, 1948, pp. 58-59). It would be easy to tear apart the parallels drawn between North Carolina and her neighbors on either side. Latin Americanists find objections to the conclusions drawn from the history of the Incas and the Mayas, and from the history of Spain's expansion over seas. As Dr. Beard had indicated, no scholar is specialist enough in all fields of history to check the errors of fact and interpretation in Professor Toynbee's whole works, but each in his small corner, is beginning to tear apart the philosophy of the most-talked-of historian philosopher of the moment.

I should like to lay criticism aside and thank Professor Toynbee for reminding us that we must look beyond the changing boundaries of individual states to the essential unity of civilization. The civilization of the United States cannot be understood even by a study of the history of the United States and England. The whole field of Western civilization is too small for the purpose. We must transcend that and turn to Greece, Rome, Persia, Syria,

Palestine, yea, we can scarcely omit any of them that have gone before. It is a hopeful sign that Professor Toynbee reminds religious thinkers that man is not essentially good, that in our efforts to bring in the millennium by good works, we must not lose sight of the fact that "original sin" is still with us and will be as long as one member of the human race inhabits this globe.

# Arminianism In American Religious Life

HAROLD B. KUHN

The man from whom Arminian Theology derives its name is much less known than the movement itself. Born at Onderwater in The Netherlands in 1560, Jacobus Arminius (latinized from Harmensen) studied theology in Utrecht and Leyden, and later in Geneva under the famous Calvinist Beza. Shortly after his ordination in 1588, he was commissioned to defend Beza's doctrine of Predestination against proposed changes. In the course of his studies, he came to adopt the positions which he had undertaken to refute. Upon his appointment to a professorship in theology in Leyden in 1603, he found himself almost immediately in conflict with Gomarus, who was for the remaining years of Arminius' life to be his chief opponent.

Beginning with an examination of Beza's doctrine of Predestination, Arminius shortly found himself questioning other Calvinistic formulations. Before noting these, it is necessary to observe that he essentially re-defined the Reformed teaching of predestination, in terms as follows: God predestines men to salvation upon the basis of His foresight of what men will do, not (as Gomarus held) upon the basis of an arbitrary election to salvation, with a consequent reprobation of others. The classic Calvinistic position concerning repentance and faith was that God awakens men to these responses because they are predetermined to salvation. This, Arminius felt, confounded human and divine acts, and neutralized human freedom.

In reformulating this tenet, Arminius found himself in conflict with other principles of high Reformed teaching. The teaching of Total Depravity, as currently

formulated, seemed likewise in conflict with what he felt to be the Christian doctrine of human freedom. Unconditional Election (with its corollary of unconditional reprobation,) seemed open to the same objection. The tenet of a Limited Atonement seemed inconsistent with clear statements of Scripture which offered salvation to all men. Irresistible Grace appeared to him a teaching which stood or fell with Unconditional Election, as did also the tenet of Unconditional Perseverance.

Arminius did not live to see the issues between himself and Dutch Calvinism resolved by Synod, for he died in 1609 before the meeting of such a Synod, in the calling of which he was largely instrumental. He did not himself formulate an anti-Calvinistic system; and in The Netherlands, Arminianism was rather a Remonstrant movement within the Reformed Church than an institutionalized theology. It may be said also that his followers were more Arminian than was he himself. At the Synod of Dort (1618-1619) about three hundred of Arminians, mostly clergymen and including the eminent Simon Episcopius, were expelled. Nevertheless, Arminian teachings exerted a powerful influence upon Dutch theology, and were echoed in the Church of England by the Latitudinarian Movement.

It remained for a new movement in British theology to knit Arminianism into a theology in its own right. The Wesleys, forced by circumstances to pursue their work outside the Church of England, gave to Arminianism a new life. John Wesley shared that which has been a common factor in Arminian thought, namely an aversion to the harsher aspects of Calvin-

ism. We must not, however, suppose that Wesley merely took over the work of Arminius and the Remonstrants wholesale; rather, he added some distinctively new features, notably two: the doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit; and the doctrine of Entire Sanctification.

The significance of Arminianism for American theology grows in large part out of the development of Wesley's thought. Before tracing this, however, it is necessary that we observe within American Calvinism a reaction against some of its features -- in fact, against the same factors which Arminius himself found unacceptable. This reaction had assumed such proportion that by the middle of the eighteenth century, Jonathan Edwards was occupied with the question. By this time, *Arminian* had become a term of reproach, applied to those opponents of Puritanism who found the doctrine of human spiritual inability unacceptable. In this sense, Arminianism in New England was similar to the movement in The Netherlands, namely an unorganized protest movement, centering in theological institutions, but without specific ecclesiastical form. One gets the impression from Calvinistic polemic of this period that the term *Arminian* had become something of an emotionally-charged word, employed rather loosely to discredit those who questioned the formulation of high Calvinism from the point of view of either Scripture or of personal philosophy.

In addition to the effect which this unofficial form of the Arminian movement exerted upon the theology of America, there was brought to bear upon our scene a much more powerful form of anti-Calvinistic theology in the Methodist movement. Beginning about the middle of the eighteenth century, the followers of Wesley penetrated the Colonies, and into the hinter-land of America in a manner which affords one of the most romantic chapters in our religious history. Trained in the theology of John Wesley, which was largely embodied in his Sermons, preachers of varied degrees of education penetrated the wilderness by horseback, evangelizing as they went, and establishing

Methodist Societies at a rate almost unparalleled in church history.

Emphases of the message of the Methodists were, especially, personal responsibility and possible salvation for all men. Both of these were specifically derived from Arminius' tenets. They resulted in a brand of aggressive evangelism which not only produced a phenomenal growth, but also was a dynamic force in christianizing American life at its cutting edge. At the same time, apart from the direct results achieved by Methodist evangelism, there were repercussions within nominally Calvinistic denominations. Whereas strict Calvinism would produce one type of evangelistic approach, Arminianism would logically produce another. In point of fact, frontier evangelism within all groups came to conform to the free-will pattern.

With the growth of Methodism came the development of her fixed institutions—colleges, theological schools, and the like. The theological seminaries became centers for the systematic and scholarly exposition of the Arminian-Wesleyan theology, and produced, particularly in the nineteenth century, a group of very able scholars and a formidable theological literature. Coming later in point of time than the Presbyterians with their Princeton University, the Methodists exerted through their universities a profound influence upon American life.

The institutional impact of Arminianism upon our national life was paralleled by its effect upon the theological atmosphere. Before noting this, however, it is helpful to observe that in The Netherlands, Arminian theology tended, following the death of its immediate formulators, to become attenuated. Some of its adherents became Arian in their Christology; and in general, the Dutch movement succumbed to the impact of liberal theology. In America, however, Wesleyanism remained, through the larger part of the nineteenth century, a vigorous opponent of the New England form of Arianism. It is the studied opinion of this writer that Methodism, up until approximately 1890, compared



favorably in this respect with the Calvinistic denominations.

During the nineteenth century, there were frequent controversies between Arminians and Calvinists, out of which grew numerous articles in periodicals, and occasional volumes such as the able but repetitious work *Objections to Calvinism* by Randolph S. Foster. In general, this controversy raged about the theoretical aspects of high Calvinism which were seldom the subject of public preaching. Whatever good purposes may have been served by this controversy, it certainly had the effect of concentrating the attention of many able Methodist upon Calvinism, as though the Geneva theology were the chief opponent of Christianity. This undeniably drew their efforts away from the task of meeting the real foe of historic Christianity, namely theological liberalism. As a result, when the impact of German thought began to be felt as a consequence of the fashionable student exchanges between American theological seminaries and the theological faculties of Germany, Methodist theologians were caught napping, or, to say the least, so engaged in combatting a fellow-movement as to be unprepared for the real conflict.

The writer is prepared to encounter difference of opinion with respect to this last point. Some Methodists will feel that Calvinism was the foe, and that Liberalism came to free American Arminianism from both this enemy and also the "scholasticism" which they inherited from John Weslev. Calvinists will likewise observe that Methodism succumbed, in large measure, to Liberalism because of the inherent weakness of all forms of Arminian theology. He feels, however, that something can be said for the view that, given a proper view of the issues involved and proper preparation, Arminianism is as able to defend itself against its foes as is Calvinism.

At this point it is well to give brief notice to the particular form which Liberalism has assumed within the Arminian movement. In view of the orientation of

Methodism in the direction of large emphasis upon experience, one might expect to discover in its liberalized form a reaction against theology, and a concentration of emphasis upon subjective experiences as sources of religious truth. Sharing with the liberal movement in general an acceptance of conventional higher biblical criticism, with a consequent depreciation of Scripture as a final authority, it faced the common task of discovering a source of authority consistent with its general principles. This task has been undertaken at two levels, the first in rather popular fashion, the second at a more sophisticated level.

In the first instance, there came, chiefly through the popular literature of the Church School and Youth Societies, a general depreciation of religious orthodoxy, in favor of "the life." Objective truth in religion was subordinated to the insights which came to men of good heart and of good will. At the same time, the two crisis religious experiences which were the strength of historic Methodism (namely, conversion and entire sanctification) were replaced in emphasis by "experiences" which were presumably common to all men, and relatively independent of the acceptance of Christian theology. In place of the *New Birth*, there came an emphasis upon life's several transitional experiences as "new births" and a guided reaction against "narrowing" the term 'new birth' to any specific regenerating experience. Emphasis was shifted from conversion to growth, from evangelism to religious education. This does not mean that the term 'evangelism' was eliminated, but rather that it was radically reformulated so as to not only draw emphasis from the evangelistic procedures which made Methodism great, but also identified them with the rather unsophisticated life of the frontier, and hence no longer relevant to the life of the church.

The other level at which the request for a new religious authority was undertaken was that of Empirical Theology. Taking as a point of departure the postulate that Personality was the final and irreducible



element in the universe, the currents of liberal Arminian thought were guided in the direction of the philosophy of Personal Idealism. This embodied much of the work of Renouvier and Lotze, though its advocates have latterly tended to find in it a "Perennial Philosophy" and to find all true philosophy since Plato to be really a form of Personal Idealism. It would unduly expand this article to sketch in detail the philosophical movement initiated by Borden Parker Bowne, pupil of Hermann Lotze. It must be said, however, that it is a very thorough and well-knit system, embodying an idealistic metaphysics, a rugged value-ethics, and a daring theology.

Relevant to this discussion, two points deserve special mention. First, Personal Idealism is a stalwart defender of man's moral freedom. Having critically examined the factors which serve in some measure to determine human conduct, it preserves at this point the genius of Arminianism in its contention that after all determining factors are recognized, there remains yet to every person a tight area within which he is immune from constraint, and in which he is competent to not only hand down discriminatory moral judgements, but also to commit himself in the most profound moral and spiritual sense.

The second point which is worthy of mention is the tendency within Personal Idealism to make man's negative moral experience (namely his experience with the problem of evil) determinative for theology. This has been accompanied by thorough analysis of the moral situation, and latterly by the assertion that there is an irreducible residue of evil in the universe, the presence of which is irreconcilable with the existence of a God who is both morally perfect (holy) and completely powerful (omnipotent). This has led to the formulation of the position of Theistic Finitism (doctrine of a limited God). The advocates of the system contend that the realities of the universe demand the recognition of an antithesis between a God of all-power and a God of all-goodness. Personal Idealists find little difficulty in sacrificing the first in favor of the second.

The theological implications of such a teaching are obviously profound; it is difficult (or impossible) to reconcile them with the historic principles of the Methodist Church as embodied in the Twenty-Five Articles. In general, however, the ground has been prepared in the major sections of the denomination for the subordination of historic principles of Christianity to what are held to be the clear dictates of experience. With respect to the doctrine of salvation, upon which the emphasis in Arminianism has been strong, the newer theology based upon empiricism shifts the emphasis from what God does for man to *what God does alongside man*, from God in Christ suffering *for* man to what God, involved in the same moral schizophrenia as man, suffers along *with* man. From some points of view at least, the outcome of the moral enterprise is uncertain. One duty lies clearly before man, namely to take place alongside a struggling God in His struggle for Value. Salvation thus comes, not by Grace, but as a result of a life slanted in a certain direction. "Salvation" thus becomes a matter of moral endeavor and is in no vital way related to the death of Christ.

In this connection, one problem deserves special attention: is this movement in Arminian theology the inevitable outcome of Arminian principles? Does this reversal of historic Christian theology, which Personal Idealism implies, follow from those elements in the Arminian approach which it holds in reaction against Calvinism? Some will reply to these queries with a hasty affirmative. Calvinists will feel that Arminianism, in its emphasis upon some measure of human initiative in repentance, has done despite to the doctrine of the divine sovereignty, and has left open the gate to the final renunciation of that sovereignty. Against this argument, some Arminians will reply that those denominations which have been historically Calvinistic have by no means a perfect record in the matter of maintaining high views of God, and that their deviations from historic Christianity are no more to be attributed to their historic Calvinism than

are those of methodistic Arminianism to be laid at the door of her opposition to the doctrine of the Divine Decrees as understood by Calvin. Perhaps this is not a strong argument; what it really seems to signify is, that the clue to the success of theological liberalism in the major denominations is to be found elsewhere than in their respective attitudes at one point in their theology.

A final consideration in this paper is the newer historic form which the Arminian movement has assumed in America. It is noteworthy that Arminianism was a powerful guiding force in the religious life of German immigrants of the nineteenth century. There arose in consequence two Churches of strong Arminian principles, namely the United Brethren and the Evangelical Church, newly united to become the Evangelical United Brethren Church. In general, these bodies have maintained their historic doctrinal principles longer than the largest exponent of Arminianism; latterly, however, liberalizing tendencies have become prominent in the life of these bodies.

During the nineteenth century, two significant types of schism occurred within the Methodist Church. The first was the general schism, occasioned by a sociological question which divided the nation as a whole. As a result, the Methodist Church South pursued its independent existence until about 1940. There was also the second form, the schism in which a smaller group separated itself from the major body, and maintained a separate existence in the same general geographic location. This second form of schism produced, especially, three bodies, the Methodist Protestant Church, the Free Methodist Church, and the Wesleyan Methodist. (There were also smaller splinter churches, none of which has however become sufficiently large to be reckoned as a force in determining the course of Arminian theology.

The two mentioned last, namely the Free Methodist and the Wesleyan Methodist Churches, have served a special function within the Arminian movement, namely

that of conserving explicitly the historic positions of Methodist-Arminian belief. These bodies have grown to significant size, have developed their own organizations to an efficiency comparable to that of the parent body, have maintained their own schools at the collegiate level, and are now developing graduate theological training. It needs to be said that neither of these bodies have sought to develop an independent or 'characteristic' school of theology. They have, however, maintained their historic doctrinal positions and have succeeded in formulating them in such a manner as to make them satisfying to a constituency which includes a high percentage of well-trained and critical persons.

Something needs to be said concerning the independent bodies which have arisen within the Arminian movement during the past half century. The largest of these is the Church of the Nazarene, which has gathered its large membership not only from the unchurched, but also from the liberalized Arminian bodies, many of whose members found the newer forms of theology unsatisfying. For some years, the Nazarene Movement has shown a phenomenal growth, being one of the most rapidly growing Churches in America. It, and its offshoot, the Pilgrim Holiness Church, has followed much the same doctrinal course as the two Methodist bodies just mentioned.

It would require much space to chronicle the remaining bodies which have pursued the Arminian tradition in America, some of which like the Mennonites have had their largest constituency among immigrants from northern Europe who have contributed so richly to our rural America. Likewise, in the Evangelical wing of Quakerism, as expressed by the followers of J. J. Gurney, Arminianism has been a dominant doctrinal force. Mention must be made, however, of a newer and somewhat irregular movement, namely the so-called Pentecostal Movement. It is too early to assess the importance of this branch of the Church. With respect to its doctrine, it is safe to say that it is partly related to Arm-

inianism, and partly to the ecstatic movements which have appeared occasionally during the history of the Church.

It may be said, in conclusion, that the Arminian Movement played a role of superlative significance during the formative period of our nation, both in its direct impact upon the life of the expanding territories which comprise the United States, and also in the impetus which it gave to aggressive evangelism in the Calvinistic bodies. Possibly it is not going too far to observe that its emphasis upon personal responsibility and personal initiative contributed also to the general democratic tone of our national life. Certainly the Arminian emphasis upon holiness of life has profoundly influenced the tone of our social structure, which until recently has been in reasonable agreement with the older practical ethic of Methodism, which condemned intemperance, divorce, gambling, and the like. It is significant that the weakening of sentiment against these and kindred evils in American society has been parallel to the relaxation of standards in the major Arminian denominations.

With reference to the future, the prospects for Arminianism in American religious life seem two-fold. First, the denominations in which liberalism has come to be the prevailing theological mood, having already lost their historic Arminian principles, will share the future which the American scene will afford to liberal Christianity in general. In this future, the emphasis promises to be in the direction of extreme stress upon human effort and

human endeavor, with a vigorous defense of human moral freedom. Whether the movement will be able to maintain its emphasis upon the unique value of persons in the face of the encroachment of premature collectivism remains to be seen. Logically it should be a bulwark against both the threatening anti-hill cultures and the materialism upon which they are based.

In those areas of American church life where orthodox Arminianism prevails, there is a discernible tendency toward cooperation with all Evangelical groups, and away from the historic conflict between Arminianism and Calvinism. While recognizing and respecting mutual differences, both Arminians and Calvinists (and it may be noted that most Calvinistic groups in America today hold modified Genevan views) are realizing in increasing measure that the emergency of the times demands that little effort be expended in internecine Christian conflict, and that major emphasis be placed upon a vigorous assertion of the principles of historic Christianity. Leaders in both groups are seeking to exploit the broad areas of doctrinal agreement between the theological movements, recognizing that Arminianism and Calvinism are both *approaches* to theology rather than distinct theologies. These leaders likewise recognize that the vastly increased dimensions of their common task requires an increase in common endeavor based upon a frank recognition of secondary differences within the framework of agreement upon major and essential tenets of the Christian Faith.

# Sin and Sinfulness: A Study In New Testament Terminology

GEORGE ALLEN TURNER AND J. HAROLD GREENLEE

## THE SUBJECT DEFINED

The New Testament concept of grace cannot be understood apart from its underlying concept, the doctrine of sin. Perhaps the most subtle aspect of Biblical hamartiology is sinfulness, by which is meant, not the act of sin, but the moral conditions which cause sin. While sins are properly regarded as acts of rebellion against God and are objective in nature, sinfulness is a condition, principle, or state and hence is subjective in nature. The former is related to God, the latter to man. A study of sinfulness therefore involves psychology; here hamartiology and anthropology converge.

## PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

With the exception of extended discussions of original sin, theologians and expositors have spent comparatively little time on the subjective aspect of sin. Most treatments of sin are content to deal with the more obvious features of sinful conduct, leaving many of the more subtle aspects of sin unexplored or superficially treated. It is the purpose of this study to isolate and analyze this more evasive concept of the subjective aspect called inward sin or sinfulness.

## THE PROBLEM

The New Testament uses some nine different synonyms for sin—that is, nine families of words. These nine synonyms, together with their cognates, total twenty four different words. There are approximately 386 occurrences of these synonyms. Of these, *hamartia* (ἁμαρτία) and its cognate forms are the most important and occur most frequently, a total of about 214 times. The basic meaning of this term is to miss the mark or the designated goal, hence is the opposite of *teleios* (τέλειος)—complete, perfect, entire—and, es-

pecially in Romans, to *dikaioisune* (δικαιοσύνη)—conformity to the standard, to God.<sup>1</sup>

While the cautious student will bear in mind that "in the common intercourse of life, words easily lose their original precision,"<sup>2</sup> yet a careful study of etymology is indispensable. The statement is often made that ἁμαρτία in the singular "would seem to denote primarily, *not sin considered as an action*, but sin considered as the quality of action."<sup>3</sup> This generalization needs to be substantiated. How accurate is the statement? If true as a generalization is it true of other New Testament writers or is it a characteristic of Paul only? Does Paul use the singular of this word to indicate a studied and precise distinction between "sin" and "sinfulness"? Is it actually a qualitative usage, as distinct from specific acts, or is it simply used to designate sins in the aggregate? How valid is the conventional statement that the New Testament writers are careful to maintain a distinction between the principle of sin and acts of sin? In other words, does the New Testament recognize a distinction between sinful conduct and sinfulness in principle as underlying sin, and can this generalization be substantiated on objective linguistic grounds?

Distinctions of this kind are admittedly rare in the Old Testament, where a more objective and physical view of sin prevails. Intimations of the importance of motive, of the sin principle, are, however, apparent even in the Old Testament in such words as *avah* (עוה) —bent, crooked, perverse,

<sup>1</sup>H. Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*, I, p. 99.

<sup>2</sup>Umbreit, *Die Sunde*, p. 49, cited in Cremer *op. cit.*, p. 98.

<sup>3</sup>Cremer, *op. cit.*, p. 100.



Such words "represent the perversion or distortion of nature which is caused by evil doing." The prophets speak of correcting the source of evil as well as pardon (e.g., Ezek. 36:26, "the stony heart"). The Psalmist also is concerned not only with his sinful acts and resultant guilt but also with their inner source (Ps. 51:7, 10). Later writers of the inter-testamental period are relatively more concerned with the subjective side and with the source of sin (e.g., IV Esdras 3:20-27; 4:30, 31; 7:118). Rabbinic sources indicate a similar concern with the source of sin: "an evil eye and the evil principle and hatred of mankind drive a man out of the world" (Pirke Aboth 2:15); and, "Who is mighty? He that controlleth his evil disposition" (Pirke Aboth 4:29). The rabbis made much of the Evil Yetzer ("evil imagination", as in Gen. 6:5) as the source of rebellious acts.<sup>9</sup>

Post-Reformation theological tradition has emphasized the distinction between act and principle, between source and consequence. Calvin: "We say, therefore, that man is corrupted by a natural depravity, but which did not originate from nature." Barclay: "... not only their words and deeds only, but all their imaginations are evil perpetually ..... as proceeding from this depraved and wicked seed .....". This evil principle is usually identified with "original sin," as in the Articles of Religion in Anglican and Methodist churches. Watson: "This connection of positive evil, as the effect, with privation of life and image of God, as the cause, accounts for the 'corruption of man's nature.'" Wesley: "..... the sin which still remains .... even in them that are regenerate .... a conviction of our proneness to evil, of an heart

bent to backsliding, ..... a conviction of the sin still cleaving to all our words and actions." None is more precise than a Puritan preacher in Boston in 1699: "Every actual sin leaves a spot, a stain, a filthiness behind it. There is therefore a two-fold taking away of sin, answerable to the two-fold mischief which it doeth the man, by its adhesion to him: the former is by Justification, the latter by Sanctification."<sup>10</sup> Likewise Kuizenga:

"The personal nature both of sin and salvation make necessary not only the experience of conversion but also the nature of sanctification."<sup>11</sup>

Mozeley: "..... there is a goodness and a sinfulness in disposition as well as in acts."<sup>12</sup> The question now raised is whether these theologians and expositors have correctly supposed that a qualitative distinction between sins and sinfulness is set forth in the New Testament.

Grammarians as well as theologians speak of the two-fold nature of sin. Trench quotes Chrysostom as distinguishing between *hamartia* (ἁμαρτία) as designating original sin and *hamartema* (ἁμαρτήμα) as "the several acts and outcomings of sin" from which infants are free.<sup>13</sup> Cremer, in the work previously cited, concludes that ἁμαρτία in the singular with the article designates sin as "a principle manifesting itself in the conduct of the subject. Without the article ἁμαρτία .... is used where the reference is to the idea itself and not to the collective sum of manifestations."<sup>14</sup> Likewise Thayer:

In this sense ἡ ἁμαρτία ... as a power exercising dominion over men (*sin as a principle and power*) is rhetorically represented as an imperial personage ... ; the dictate of sin or an impulse

<sup>9</sup>R. B. Girdlestone, *Synonyms of the Old Testament*, p. 130. E. g., II Sam. 19:19.

<sup>10</sup>See S. Schecter, *Some aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, pp. 219-93.

<sup>11</sup>John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, II, 1, p. 277.

<sup>12</sup>Robert Barclay, *Theses Theologicae*, cited by Philo Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom*, I, p. 790.

<sup>13</sup>Richard Watson, *Theological Institutes*, II, p. 79.

<sup>14</sup>John Wesley, "The Scripture Way of Salvation," *Standard Sermons*, II, pp. 454 ff.

<sup>15</sup>Samuel Williard, *The Fountain Opened*, pp. 78f.

<sup>16</sup>John A. Kuizenga, "Sin," *International Standard Bible Encyclopedia*, IV, 2801.

<sup>17</sup>J. B. Mozeley, *Predestination*, cited in James Orr, *Sin as a Problem of Today*, p. 240.

<sup>18</sup>R. C. Trench, *Synonyms of the New Testament*, 7th ed., p. 228.

<sup>19</sup>Cremer, *op. cit.*, p. 101.



proceeding from it .... Thus *ἁμαρτία* is the source whence the several evil acts proceed."

But the quotations cited by Thayer in support of these generalizations are, with one exception, all from Paul's writings. Is this a habit of Paul, due perhaps to the influence of rabbinic modes of expression, or is it a grammatical principle which was generally observed? The investigation narrows down, therefore, to whether or not *ἁμαρτία* in the singular designates a *principle* of sin which needs *cleansing* as distinct from *acts* which need *pardon*.

#### THE EVIDENCE

From the standpoint of etymology, *ἁμαρτήματα* signifies the result of action, and *ἁμαρτία* signifies quality of an action.<sup>1</sup> Old Testament usage bears out these distinctions in the case of the former but not the latter. In the Greek Old Testament both words mean "an act of sin," "a sin committed." There may be partial exception in the idea of "a sin offering," which is expressed by *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* or a similar phrase; but even in these instances the sin-offering seems to be for a *sin* rather than for *sinfulness*. In The Old Testament, therefore, we must assume that both *ἁμαρτία* and *ἁμαρτήματα* are regular words for an act of sin, and that the former is more commonly used than the latter.

In the New Testament, on the other hand, the distinction between these two words is often clear. While *ἁμαρτία* appears more than 200 times, *ἁμαρτήματα* occurs only five times, according to Moulton and Geden's Concordance. The meaning of *ἁμαρτήματα* is always "an act of sin." As the ratio of their frequency would suggest, *ἁμαρτία* also is used to mean an act of sin; and it carries this meaning in practically all of the 75 instances or so where it is used in the *plural*. In the singular, however, the situation is quite different. After allowing for differences of interpretation of some passages, it appears that of the approximately 125 in-

stances of the singular of *ἁμαρτία* in the New Testament, only between ten and twenty designate an *act* of sin.

*ἁμαρτία* is used both with and without the definite article. In the plural, the presence or absence of the article would generally imply only the difference between definite and indefinite acts of sin. It is the significance of this word when it is used in the singular which is of particular importance to this study.

In the New Testament, the word *ἁμαρτία* *without* the article doubtless sometimes designates an act of sin. In these instances *ἁμαρτία* may be considered as synonymous with *ἁμαρτήματα*. Yet these instances are distinctly in the minority, comprising no more than ten per cent.—possibly much less—of the examples. In this category may be listed Matt. 12:31, "every sin and blasphemy" (ARV); II Cor. 11:7, "did I commit a sin" (ARV); and I John 5:16, "a sin which is not unto death," and "a sin unto death."

Much more common, however, are the instances where *ἁμαρτία* seems to have the very meaning which its etymology suggests—*sinfulness*, the quality of sin. It is a commonly recognized grammatical principle that nouns may be thus used without an article to denote quality. A very few of the many available examples include John 13:35, "if ye have *love* one to another"; Rom. 14:15, "thou walkest no longer in *love*" (ARV) —literally, according to love"; Luke 2:14, "*Glory* to God in the highest, and on earth peace"; and Matt. 17:20, "If ye have *faith*," *ἁμαρτία* is not thus used in the Synoptic Gospels, Matt. 12:31, cited above, being the only occurrence of this word in the singular in these gospels. From the Fourth Gospel may be mentioned John 16:8, "he will reprove the world of sin" (similarly 16:9), and possibly some other instances. In the First Epistle of John, this idea seems to be present in 1:8, "If we say that we have no sin"; 3:5, "in him is no sin"; and 5:17, "All unrighteousness is sin"; and in Heb. 11:25, "the pleasures of sin." In the Pauline writings, the idea of quality is probably

<sup>1</sup>J. H. Thayer, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel G. Green, *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament*, rev. ed., pp. 144-5.

intended in Cor. 5:21, "him . . . who knew no sin" (better, "him who did not know sin"). Most Pauline instances occur in Romans: e.g., 3:20, "knowledge of sin"; 5:13, "sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law"; 7:7, "Is the law sin?"; and perhaps 8:10, "the body is dead because of sin."

With the article, *ἡ ἀμαρτία* in the singular sometimes refers to an act of sin, the article denoting definiteness. Acts 7:60, "lay not this sin to their charge," is an example. Yet obvious as such usage may seem, the instance just given is practically unique in the New Testament.

A second usage with the article is found in the examples where the phrase refers to sin in a generic or collective sense—that is, in the same sense in which the singular "man" is used to mean "mankind," "the human race." This usage occurs in John 8:21, "ye . . . shall die in your sin" ARV; the Authorized Version incorrectly reads "sins")—cf. verse 24, "ye shall die in your sins—and in Rom. 5:20, "where sin abounded."

Akin to the generic sense is the use of the article to refer to a noun typical of its class, as in the similar use of the word "man" in Matt. 12:35, "*The good man* out of his good treasure bringeth forth good things: and *the evil man* out of his evil treasure bringeth forth evil things" (ARV; the Authorized Version incorrectly reads "a good man" and "an evil man"). In this passage, "the good man" and "the evil man" is any good man and any evil man, each being held up as representative of all men of their class. Examples of this use of the word "sin" are rather rare in the New Testament, but an example probably occurs in John 8:34, "whosoever committeth sin," where the word "sin" may be understood as any sin, standing as a representative of all sins.

By far the largest group of instances of *ἡ ἀμαρτία* in the singular with the definite article, however, are those in which, according to the regular grammatical rule, the article seems to signify sin as an abstract noun personified or made a sep-

arate object of thought." This is similar to the English custom of capitalizing an abstract noun when the noun is personified, as in Acts 28:4, "whom . . . Justice hath not suffered to live" (ARV). This usage seems to comprise a great majority of the occurrences of *ἡ ἀμαρτία*—the singular noun with the definite article. As in the common usage without the article, here also, in thus picturing sin with personal characteristics, as a figurative person or "thing," the New Testament writers follow a practice recognized in the usage of other abstract nouns. I Cor. 13:4-7 presents an extended list of "personal" characteristics of love (AV, "charity"). Rom. 5:3-5 refers to tribulation, steadfastness, approvedness, and hope (ARV) as working or accomplishing goals, as though these abstract ideas were objective realities. Eph. 2:14 speaks of Christ as "our peace," just as we might speak of him as "our Lord," thus figuratively picturing peace as though it were a person or "thing." (Contrast the following verse, 2:15, where "peace" without the article denotes quality -- "making peace.")

This personification of sin, *ἡ ἀμαρτία*, or of picturing it figuratively as a "thing" in itself, is particularly characteristic of Rom. 5-8. Yet it is not unknown elsewhere in the New Testament. John 8:34 refers to being "the servant of sin," picturing "Sin" as a master who rules. James 1:15 figuratively pictures both "lust" and "sin" as giving birth to offspring, which obviously is literally possible only to living beings." Heb. 3:13 thus speaks of sin as a deceiver, and 12:4 as an enemy in warfare; and in the light of the latter passage Heb. 12:1 doubtless refers to laying aside, not a particular sin, as the AV and ARV both seem to imply—"the sin which doth so easily beset us"—but rather "sin" as a real object (figuratively, of course) meaning the

<sup>1</sup>Green, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-4.

<sup>2</sup>It is possible, however, that the article here is used merely for definiteness, as ARV implies: ". . . drawn away by his own lust . . . Then the lust, . . . beareth sin: and the sin, . . . bringeth forth death."

force, the idea itself, the principle of sin." Not as a person, but as a material object, I Cor. 15:56 graphically describes sin as "the sting of death." In all this it must be borne in mind, however, that this personification of these abstract nouns, or considering them as tangible objects, is purely figurative. It must not be supposed that the New Testament writers conceived of sin, peace, etc., as material objects.

We may now turn to the occurrences of ἡ ἀμαρτία in Rom. 5-8, observing the use of this phrase to describe sin, not as a particular act of sin, not as the sum total of sins, but as "Sin," a force or principle underlying sinful acts. Since ἡ ἀμαρτία is capable of the other meanings, it is possible that a few instances here referred to may be subject to alternative interpretations without invalidating the general conclusion. The following passages are pertinent: Rom. 5:12, "sin entered into the world, and death by sin." 5:21, "sin hath reigned unto death." 6:6ff., "the body of sin"; "he died unto sin . . . , he liveth unto God"; "dead indeed unto sin"; "Let not sin therefore reign"; "Neither yield ye your members . . . unto sin"; "servants of sin"; "made free from sin"; "the wages of sin . . . the gift of God." 7:8ff., "sin . . . wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; "sin revived, and I died"; "sin . . . deceived me"; "that sin . . . might become exceeding sinful"; "sin that dwelleth in me" does the evil ("Sin"; not a particular act of sin).

#### CONCLUSIONS

It is sometimes suggested that ἡ ἀμαρτία, particularly Paul's use of this expression in Romans 5-8, refers to sin as a principle, the idea being that the definite article prefixed to the noun is the identifying mark of the sin principle. The present investigation does not contradict this idea in general. A more comprehensive point of view, however, may be stated as follows: In general,

ἀμαρτία in the New Testament refers, *not to an act of sin, but rather to something which underlies and issues in acts of sin, something which also accompanies and follows these acts of sin.*

*Without the definite article*, this noun refers particularly to sin from the point of view of its quality, essence, or nature. It carries the idea of sinfulness. Sinfulness, being a quality, requires, not forgiveness, but rather purging, removal, cleansing.

*With the definite article*, this noun regularly refers to "Sin"—sin as a force figuratively objectified, either as a person, able to rule over man, to bring him into subjection to itself, and to act in a number of ways as a personal agent would act; or as some other material object, such as a "sting." This usage is to be clearly distinguished from the comparatively few instances where the same phrase is used to refer to sin in a generic or collective sense, as simply the totality of acts of sin. Here again, sin is pictured, not as an act which needs to be forgiven, but as a person who must be put to death, a force which must be rendered completely inoperative" (Rom. 6:6), or as some other objective reality which must be dealt with in a drastic manner.

In the New Testament, therefore, but not commonly in the Old Testament, ἀμαρτία, when used in the singular, either with or without the article, appears usually to refer to ideas which are associated with a need in the human heart which goes beyond the need of forgiveness of sinful acts, a need which arises from the presence of sinful tendencies in man. The New Testament seems clearly to teach that this deeper need can and should be met. Grammar and exegesis, therefore, appear to bear out the insights of generations of gospel preachers, who, like the Puritan divine of Boston, affirm that "there is a two-fold taking away of sin, answerable to the two-fold mischief which it doeth the man . . . "

<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., *Expositor's Greek Testament*, ad loc.

## Book Reviews

*History of American Congregationalism*,  
by Gaius Glenn Atkins and Frederick  
L. Fagley. Boston, The Pilgrim Press.  
432 pages. \$2.00

Although many books have been written about the beginning of Congregationalism in England, and its subsequent growth in America, after being transplanted to New England, this book has been written to emphasize the important developments in American Congregationalism in the last fifty years, as a result of its history.

The authors fulfil their purpose in a commendable way. Both of the writers are evidently well versed in Congregational history and polity. Starting with the religious situation in England at the end of the Tudor Period and continuing to about 1942, the book recounts most important events in Congregationalism in an instructive and readable fashion.

Well known to many people are the experiences of the Pilgrims: first, in Scrooby, England; then in Leyden, Holland; and finally, in the Plymouth colony. Also well known are the incidents connected with Governor John Winthrop and the Puritans in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Not so well known are the experiences of the Plumber's Hall Society and Richard Fitz in England; of the Norwich Church gathered under the leadership of Robert Browne and termed "the first *regularly constituted* Congregational church on English soil" (p. 33); and of the Martin Mar-Prelate Affair. All these events together with the other important ones in the denomination's history are related and carefully supported through the use of footnotes.

Not only is the beginning and extension of Congregationalism retold, but also fully explained in detail are such things as the formation of the denominational councils;

the founding of Congregational Colleges and seminaries; the proposals for union with other denominations; the ministry in Congregationalism; and, in the last chapter, a resume of Congregationalism as an adventure in religious liberty. It is evident from a perusal of the contents of the book that it is quite exhaustive and inclusive.

The formation of committees, councils, and associations within Congregationalism and the limits of the control of each group have been vaguely understood by many people, even by those who belong to the denomination. The chapters titled "The Council: Its Formations and Changes In Its Structure" and "The Council and The Boards" are of great help in understanding just how much cooperation is possible between individual churches that are so loosely knit together. "The churches were facing the great problem which is inherent in the very nature of democracy: how to maintain individual independence and still have sufficient cooperation to accomplish results in common enterprises." pg. 201.

The authors have been very objective in their presentation of all the facts and in their interpretation of them. While inclined to emphasize the valuable achievements of their own denomination, they have done so in a limited and conservative manner.

Due to the authorship by two persons there is some repetition in the book. However, as is stated in the foreword, this has been kept at a minimum. The collaboration of the two authors has resulted in an excellent presentation of American Congregationalism. At the end of the book, there are included the copies of some very important statements of faith that have been written by Congregationalists throughout the denomination's history. This supplement, together with a very complete bibliography of books that have been written



about Congregationalism, adds greatly to the value of this book under review.

To anyone who is a member of the Congregational-Christian Church or interested in it and its background or interested in the religious life of colonial New England, the careful reading of this book will be rewarding and instructive.

HARVEY L. PIERCE

*The Russian Idea*, by Nicholas Berdyaev.  
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948.  
255 pages. \$3.00.

Berdyaev purposely avoids a merely empirical portrayal of Russian history in this volume. Such a history, he admits, would prove repulsive since it would be filled with many sordid details. Instead, however, his main burden is: first, to arrive at some answer to the question, "what was the thought of the Creator about Russia," and, second, "to arrive at a picture of the Russian people which can be grasped by the mind, to arrive at the 'idea' of it."

Berdyaev prepares the reader for the number of apparent contradictions in the Russian Idea by indicating the high degree of polarization in the Russian people. For example, there is the element of humility and self-denial, while at the same time there is revolt caused by demanding justice. Again, the Russians are compassionate, yet capable of gross cruelty. He summarizes these paradoxes by saying, "One can be charmed by them, one can be disillusioned. The unexpected is always to be expected from them."

After a brief historical introduction, the author develops his theme by selecting nineteenth century thinkers and writers as illustrations of the Russian Idea. Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Bakunin, Herten, and others are carefully and skillfully analyzed. Drawing from these pen portraits, Berdyaev weaves the following threads into the tapestry of the Russian Idea: The Russian people are religious in their very make-up, for religious unrest characterizes even the unbelievers. Closely allied to this religious spirit is a strong emphasis upon eschatology. This element, combined with the fact

that the people are wedded to their soil, leads the Russian to feel that somehow the "new Jerusalem" is to be connected with the vast Russian land. Finally, this Russian spirit of religion bears a unique communal character. Berdyaev admits that Russians are less socialized than Western peoples, but, he insists, they are infinitely more community conscious, more ready for the life in common. In this regard, the author notes that the coming of the "new Jerusalem" depends upon this spirit of community and brotherhood, and, with prophet's voice, he concludes the volume with the statement that the way is being prepared in Russia for a new revelation about society which will usher in the era of the Holy Spirit or the coming of the "new Jerusalem."

This reviewer admittedly knows little or nothing about the Russian mind; hence, a critique of Berdyaev's analysis would be mere presumption. A criticism might well be aimed by some readers, however, at his partial endorsement of the Russian eschatology which will probably be considered much too limited, too earth-bound, and too nationalistic for most evangelical Christians, not to mention the fact that it is a guarded endorsement of some type of communism as the Christian ideal. Although Berdyaev has been more highly esteemed by non-Russians than by his own countrymen, his *Russian Idea* is one of the more serious attempts to make clear to the West the true Russia, her Church, and the soul of her people. To anyone interested in bettering his understanding in this respect, the book is worthy of careful reading.

PAUL F. ABEL

*How the Church Grows*, by Roy A. Burkhardt, New York: Harper and Brothers. 200 pp. \$2.00.

This book is based upon the premise that the church is increasingly irrelevant in our secular world. If it is to fulfill its mission in the earth, it must be reborn. If this can be evolved, the course of American history may be radically changed. "If all the half loyalty and the secret discipleship and



the lukeworm fealty that are accorded to God were suddenly to flame into fiery, zealous devotion, this generation would save an imperiled civilization." This would mean a social salvation founded on hearts cleansed and motivated by divine love.

It is probably true that every true shepherd of God's people during the past two thousand years has earnestly striven to "stir the flame into fiery, zealous devotion." Apparently, they haven't been too successful. Dr. Burkhardt undertakes to tell us how it may be done. Among his many suggestions, the following are typical.

1. There is need for new preaching. An analysis is made of the message of present day preaching. Some sermons center in the Scriptures; others are experience-centered. Some emphasize faith, others works; some are personal, others social. In conservative circles, there is much preaching on atonement, the second coming of Christ and heaven and hell.

The seminaries are responsible in large measure for the present inadequate role of the church, for they major on training men to preach while they give little or no preparation for leading people to a vital faith and giving them the passion to live by it. The results of this are seen in some very disheartening statistics (quoted from another author). Only about five percent of the membership of the contemporary protestant churches is truly sincere, while perhaps another five percent participate regularly in the life of the church.

2. It demands new leadership. The true church ever seeks practical goals. Therefore, an adequate professional staff is required to furnish specialized leadership for the many activities beyond preaching and pastoral work, including music, religious education, psycho-therapy and vocational guidance. These leaders must be recruited and trained at no little cost.

3. The key to success is the United Church. Local churches must be combined and denominations must merge. To realize the True Church, vast resources will be needed to support and carry out its enormously enlarged functions. But the world economic and political issues demand this

United Church with its multiform program. This church will send out skilled leadership to heal the body, to illumine the mind, to guide the growth of the spirit, to re-build the community, to direct proper health, to distribute food, to revise and organize the use of our natural resources, to aid education, to strengthen the home and to renew the church.

The author obviously envisions a super-institution which will take over and run our world. One will look far to find a more comprehensive program for the church advocated by churchmen, with the possible exception of some of the claims of the medieval popes.

WILDER R. REYNOLDS

*Religion's Place in General Education*, by  
Nevin C. Harner, Richmond, Virginia:  
John Knox Press, 1949. 167 pp. \$2.50.

The author is Professor of Christian Education in the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical and Reformed Church in the United States. He is also vice-chairman of the International Council of Religious Education.

This new book includes four lectures given by Dr. Harner at the Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary in Austin, Texas and includes as an appendix a voluminous report of a committee of the American Council on Education on "The Relation of Religion to Public Education."

The four lectures are entitled, "Religion and Education—Indivisible"; "The Place of Religion in General Education"; "An Evaluation of Christian Current Proposals"; "The Distinctive Educational Task of the Church."

Dr. Harner maintains in this work that basically education and religion are one and the same thing. He says that it is only when a supernaturalism with its doctrine of total depravity makes religion otherworldly, on the one hand, or a thoroughgoing humanism too secular, on the other, that education ceases to be religious. The religion of the churches and the secular world of science should find common ground, says the author.

Discussing secularization of education he names the various proposed solutions to the problem of a religiously illiterate populace. The parochial school; week-day school; teaching of religion as a social phenomenon; the teaching of democracy, are all inadequate measures. Religion should be taught as it relates to all fields of study in the cultural heritage. It remains for the church to teach the Christian heritage, including the Bible, church history, Christian doctrine, liturgy, and to draw out religion's deeper personal and ethical meanings.

The Appendix of 78 pages is a reprint of a Committee Report of the American Council on Education published in 1946. This report discusses the impact of secularism on religion and life. Religion is defined as the giving of supreme allegiance to ultimate reality. Attention is given to the matter of a core curriculum in religion for general education; the secularistic definition of "Spiritual Values"; education that negates religion; the diversity of existing policies and practices with respect to religion and education; the separation of church and state; week-day religious education; what should and may be done in public schools; religion at the college and teacher level; the school the church and the home; the spiritual replenishment of modern culture.

Teaching is not only developing ability to think but presenting a cultural heritage about which to think. The student cannot be brought into full possession of his cultural heritage without the inclusion of religion as an element in that heritage, says the report.

However, to reduce religious beliefs to a common denominator for a core curriculum in general education is out of the question. There must be a distinction made between teaching and indoctrination. Religious leaders must have a meeting of minds before the schools can take any steps, for religion is to be taught without indoctrination.

Higher education must deal with the paradox of religious activity on the campus while science and philosophy are estab-

lishing mind-sets which are average to religion in all its forms.

These lectures and the report of the committee reflect concern about the impact of secularism upon the life of our people.

It appears to this reviewer to be regrettable indeed that a definition of religion should be proposed in dealing with the solution of the problem of secularism which takes religion directly into the ill it seeks to cure. If, in order for education and religion to be identical there must be mediation between naturalism and supernaturalism the ground is yielded to naturalism. The remedy takes on the disease.

If man is by nature as much inclined toward God as he is toward sin and evil so great an emphasis upon the reality of God as supernaturalism imposes should swing the nature of mankind Godward, it would seem. If man by nature is so poised between Heaven and hell a neutral environment would keep him indecisive forever.

The educational philosophy of the book is largely a reflection of the philosophy of the International Council of Religious Education as given in Vieth's *The Church and Christian Education* and Bower and Hayward's *Protestantism Faces Its Educational Task Together*.

HAROLD C. MASON

*Humanism As A Philosophy*, by Corliss Lamont. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. 368 pages. \$3.75.

This volume has the modest purpose of establishing *naturalistic* Humanism as the one accurate, appealing and universal rallying point for men of intelligence and good will to be found in the modern world. Here are conclusions "grounded on solid scientific fact". (p. 145) Here is a philosophy which offers itself as the flowering achievement of modern science and reason.

Professor Lamont brushes aside the Academic Humanism of Babbitt and More; the Catholic or Integral Humanism of Aquinas and Maritain; the sub-

jective variety of F. C. S. Schiller; the Religious Humanism of Dietrich, Reese, Wilson and Potter; and ignores completely the Evangelical Humanism of Lynn Harold Hough. The author is intent on one thing: a world-view in which Nature is everything, in which there is no supernatural and in which man is an integral part of nature and not separated from it by any sharp cleavage or discontinuity.

Thus our cosmos lacks a supernatural and eternal God and men are without supernatural and immortal souls. Nature itself constitutes the sum total of reality. Matter rather than mind is made the foundation-stuff of the universe. Theism degrades the intellect and implies an unacceptable curtailment of novelty in the world. Forced to admit, however, that men are compelled to assume *something self-existent*, Lamont makes his "faith choice" on the side of Eternal Matter --- "self-existent, self-active, self-developing, self-enduring."

With Matter thus deified it becomes no trick at all for the *naturalistic* Humanist to decry supernatural religion as the "brain-spun creation of the human imagination" teaching a cosmology of conceit and a superstitious anthropomorphism which illegitimately projects the importance of human values from this planet to existence as a whole. Belief in a personal future life is placed under special attack as almost the only *pragmatic* value of the supernatural left to modern religion. If this is true then Dr. Lamont is correct in assuming that for his purposes "we can take no more important step than to discard the illusion of immortality."

As a result, man stands alone in a universe that does not care. But even this fact means that men should face life buoyantly and bravely. Nature and nature appreciation become a therapeutic substitute for God. The "ever present glory of visible nature" takes the place of the traditional glory of the supernatural on a basis said to be "a fair exchange, and more."

With all ethical laws and systems declared to be relative, the "regulative prin-

ciple" of morality is found in a devotion to the "social good." The chief end of thought and action is the happiness and glory of man. With "service to humanity" as the watchword, organized society can look forward with confidence to a sustained pattern of happiness under the guidance of sovereign reason.

Christian thinkers can benefit from this volume in many ways. It offers an excellent resume of the philosophic, religious and cultural roots of secularism. It will enhance every christian's sense of responsibility and need for a vital witness in our world of today. It should bring to a sharper focus the deep cleavage which exists between the Gospel and the natural man.

We agree with the author that stupidity is as great a sin as selfishness; and "the moral obligation to be intelligent" ranks always among the highest of duties. For this very reason the author should be less subjective or naive in assuming all gaps in scientific knowledge as merely "temporary ignorance" which makes it possible for a given scientific hypothesis to be treated as if it were an established fact. The truth that biologists have not yet discovered precisely how organic forms evolved from inanimate matter is not quite the "little thing" Lamont casually makes it out to be. Moreover, the problem of evil is not profoundly solved by the mere declaration that evil is non-existent, or, at best, a man-made something which can be man-solved. It seems to the reviewer that this grandson of a Methodist minister is much indebted to the Christian Gospel, which he is seeking so earnestly to destroy, for noble aspirations and an optimism which is otherwise unwarranted, than appears on the surface.

Chilton C. McPheeters

*The Philosophy of Existence*, by Gabriel Marcel. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949. 96 pages. \$2.75.

The recent appearance of volumes on Existentialism, both by Existentialists and by their critics, has given the reviewers the choice of trying to read and understand the

primary sources themselves, or of reading the interpretations of others who have done so. Under review here is one of the volumes by a recognized exponent of the Cafe movement in philosophy. He is the son of a former French Minister to Sweden, a non-practising Catholic who shared the conventional nineteenth-century French agnosticism. In his youth, an aunt who had become a protestant exerted a profound influence upon his thought, as did also the sudden death of his mother.

Marcel grew up in revolt against the hypocrisy of the France of his youth, and against what seemed to him a sterile educational system. His thought pattern became one of polarity; even those who sought to surround him with every care increased his feeling of inner tension. Out of this pattern of experience, he sought to develop a metaphysics.

The volume consists of three parts, the first entitled "On the Ontological Mystery" being an exposition of the metaphysic of despair which the author believes to be the beginning of all wisdom. To him, despair consists in the recognition of the inadequacy of technics, the futility of hoping in ourselves, and the abortive tendency of all forms of self-activism. The second part, "Existence and Human Freedom" is an exposition of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, with something of a criticism of Sartre's ontology. The third part, "Testimony and Existentialism" is, according to Marcel himself, a definition of "the 'existentialist' doctrine which I personally hold."

It is not easy to get a clear conception of the meaning of such a writer as Marcel. This is due in part to the fact that he is a defeatist philosopher, whose philosophy is a generalization of his personal frustrations, plus a criticism of the culture in which he was reared. One would get the impression from this work that *all men* grew up in a sterile environment, surrounded by hypocrisy, and under circumstances which could not possibly leave any meaning to human life. At times, Marcel recognizes that he is unfair to those who sought to make his early life pleasant. At the same time, he

distils from this very experience the conclusion that "to think, to formulate and to judge is always to betray."

More serious still, Marcel in his preaching concerning freedom would liberate man from religion, from morality, and finally from objective truth, and leave him a floating chip on the chaos of what was once thought to be an orderly universe. Those of us who believe that we still perceive order in the cosmos, and objective truth in religion and morality, can scarcely escape the feeling that this Philosophy of Nothingness has spent too much time in the Latin Quarter. Just as the liberalism of a generation ago hypostatized its optimism until it had only a bland and genial universe, so today the philosophy of despair makes the frustrations of a selected group of individuals the touchstone for all philosophy. Neither Concord nor the Montmartre can tell us all about human life!

The American reader will find it difficult to follow Marcel in his constant intrusion of drama into philosophy. It is true that life presents crises and conflicts; but must these always be tragic? May there not be mistaken identities, as well as hopeless inconsistencies and paradoxes? And ought not philosophy seek to render these contractions consistent, rather than leave itself at the tender mercies of the elements of Nothingness?

A certain amount of criticism of life is wholesome. Perhaps the Anglo-Saxon world has subjected itself to too little of this. But it is strange medical practice which can do no more than diagnose. Marcel does not seem to have any method for rescuing man from the blankness which he finds life to be. Here he keeps close company with Sartre. Both seem to illustrate the futility of philosophy divorced from religion.

HAROLD B. KUHN

*A Short History of Existentialism*, by Jean Wahl. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. 58 pp. \$2.75.

The philosophy of existence, currently in vogue in France under the unof-



fical guidance of Jean-Paul Sartre, grows out of the feeling that there is evident in human affairs a process of self-destruction. American readers find it difficult to think in terms of the general futility which has seized the younger generation of Europe, not only those in the conquered lands but also those in the nations nominally victorious. Thus some are tempted to pass over the French Existentialism as ephemeral and insignificant. This is without doubt a too-easy dismissal of the philosophers of the French cafes; after all, university students of America do not grow beards during their summer's travel in Europe to look like people of no consequence.

Wahl has attempted to trace the broad Existentialist movement from its beginning with Kierkegaard, its elaboration by Jaspers and Heidegger, and its translation into the terms of the anguish of the younger French thinkers by Sartre. In Kierkegaard, the opposition between existence and essence appears to be secondary to the polarities felt within the experience of the existent individual. The four characteristics of the existent are well-known: his infinite relationship with himself, his self-consciousness of becoming, his quality of passionate thought, and his passion of freedom. It is this subjective individual who attains the high ground of affirmation of relation to the Wholly Other in the scandalization of reason. But even in his treatment of these paradoxes, Kierkegaard seeks to bring existence and transcendence together. Wahl's thesis at this point is, that Kierkegaard is nearer to those whom he opposed than might be expected. His contribution to the philosophy of existence was not that he was an absolute pioneer, but that he gave form to certain aspects in the work of Schelling, Kant and Hegel.

In the work of Jaspers and Heidegger, Wahl sees both the secularization and the

unfolding of Kierkegaard's thought. In the unfolding, Heidegger attacks the major issue, that of the problem of Being. Through his conception of *anguish*, he reaches the conclusion that we exist without any apparent reason for our existence; we sense our *Geworfenheit*, an existence without essence. This conclusion grows, for Heidegger, out of his atheism - - though as Wahl points out, he utilizes expressions which reflect the religious ideas with which he grew up, signifying that "some of the essential notions in his philosophy arise from a certain level of thought which he believed he had passed beyond." (p. 25) In him, the ideas of Nietzsche and the feelings of Kierkegaard are continually in combat.

Wahl avoids the tendency to see Sartre simply within the context of Heidegger's thought. While the former is deeply indebted to the latter, he also owes much to Husserl and Marcel. The manner in which Sartre bifurcates Being seems to Wahl to lay the foundation for something of an ontological leap, by which he concedes to the ontological need, through the massive "in-itself" that which the "for-itself" would logically preclude. The author finds Sartre an idealist; above the world of the problematical, with its inevitable failures and frustrations, stands the world of the functional "in-itself" to which consciousness opposes itself as a Nothingness.

The final section of the volume is devoted to a series of criticisms and rebuttals by Berdyaev, Gandillac, Gurvich, Koyre, Marcel and Levinas. These deal largely with the relationship existing between the system of Heidegger and Sartre. Some of these critics seem to contribute little to the general purpose of the volume, namely that of acquainting the reader with the contemporary revolt against the philosophy of essence.

HAROLD B. KUHN



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- ★ **DEGREES OFFERED** — Bachelor of Divinity and Master of Religious Education.

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